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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
LEONARD PRESTON GALL, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20040540-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an order dated 30 June 2004 the Utah Supreme Court transferred this 
case to this Court; therefore, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider defendant's 
challenges to his guilty and mentally ill pleas when defendant never moved to 
withdraw his pleas? 
Standard of review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
2. Whether counsel was disloyal or provided ineffective assistance at 
sentencing? 
Standard of review. "'Where, as here, a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is raised for the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, 
it presents a question of law/" State v. Atkin, 2006 UT App 155, ^ 6, 550 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 8. 
3. Whether the sentencing court erroneously denied defendant's 
motion for a sentencing reduction, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402? 
Standard of review. Sentencing decisions are reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, If 31,25 P.3d 985. 
4. Whether the lack of an inquiry about defendant's letter terminating 
his retained counsel was harmless error? 
Standard of review. When a trial court does not inquire into a defendant's 
dissatisfaction with his counsel, reversal is necessary only if the error was 
harmful. See State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, \ 27, 984 P.2d 382. An error is harmful if 
defendant can demonstrate that substitute counsel should have been appointed. 
See id. 
5. Should this Court consider defendant's claims that Utah's 
confinement regime for mentally ill offenders is unconstitutional and violates the 
Americans with Disabilities Act when the claims are unpreserved and defendant 
argues no exception to the preservation rule? 
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Standard of review. "[I]n general, appellate courts will not consider an 
issue, including constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal 
unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional 
circumstances." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ 13, 95 P.3d 276 (citing State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11,10 P.3d 346). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes and administrative rules, whose full text is 
reproduced in Addendum A, are relevant to the resolution of this appeal: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402 (West 2004) (conviction of lower degree of 
offense); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-16a-101 to -306 (West 2004) (commitment and 
treatment of mentally ill persons); 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R671-201-1 (original parole grant hearing schedule 
and notice); 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R671-205-1 (credit for time served). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count each of murder, a first degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (West 2004); and theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). 
R.4-5. An attorney from Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA) was 
appointed to represent defendant. R.15. 
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At the State's request, the trial court ordered that defendant be examined 
to determine his competency to stand trial. R.31-33. Both evaluators found 
defendant competent. See R.588 (sealed envelope containing evaluations). While 
the examinations were pending, defendant filed a notice of intent to rely on a 
defense of diminished capacity. R.44. On the State's motion, the Court 
subsequently ordered follow-up mental health evaluations to address 
defendant's intended defense. R.211, 217. Both evaluators reported that 
defendant said he had killed his mother to save her from torture and was thus 
aware that she was a human. See R.588 (sealed envelope), Report of Nancy B. 
Cohn, dated 26 August 2002 and Report of Mark Rindflesh, dated 10 September 
2002. Because defendant knew he was killing a human, he did not qualify for 
Utah's insanity defense. See State v. Herrera, 895 R2d 359,362 (Utah 1995). 
On 4 March 2003, Stephen McCaughey appeared as counsel and LDA 
withdrew. R.295, 362. In May 2003, Mr. McCaughey had Susan Mirow, a 
psychiatrist, evaluate defendant for a possible insanity defense. See R.588 (sealed 
envelope) Evaluation by Dr. Mirow. Defendant told Dr. Mirow that he believed 
that his mother was a torture apparatus when he attacked her. Id. Defendant 
also told Dr. Mirow that he understood that under Utah law he could not obtain 
a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict unless "you kill what you think is a 
nonhuman." Id. 
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On 10 September 2003, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the 
State. Defendant pled guilty and mentally ill to the theft charge, and to a 
reduced charge of manslaughter, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH 
CODE A N N . § 76-5-205 (West 2004), enhanced by defendant's use of a dangerous 
weapon, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203 (West 2004). R.502-08; 608:12, 
18-19. (Copies of the plea affidavit and plea hearing transcript are attached as 
Addenda B and C, respectively). As a condition of the plea agreement, 
defendant also stipulated to the entry of a judgment of not guilty by reason of 
insanity on a charge of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-203. R.502-08; 608:19-21. Based on the not guilty by 
reason of insanity judgment, the trial court immediately committed defendant to 
the Utah State Hospital. R.509-12. 
Defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his pleas. However, he did 
file a pro se motion to reduce the degree of his offenses, pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-3-402. R. 523, 525-27. At sentencing, Mr. McCaughey also made an 
oral motion to reduce the degree of the offenses. R.609:4-5. (A copy of the 
sentencing transcript is attached as Addendum D). 
Defendant was sentenced on 3 May 2004. R.538. (A copy of the sentence 
and commitment order is attached as Addendum E). The trial court denied the 
section 76-3-402 reduction motion on the grounds that "[t]his was a crime of 
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extreme violence and a 402 reduction is simply out of the question in this case." 
R.609:6. The trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive prison terms of 
one to fifteen years, with a one to five year dangerous weapon enhancement.1 
R.609:7. The trial court also found by clear and convincing evidence that 
defendant was currently mentally ill and that his mental illness made him an 
immediate physical danger to himself and others. R.609:7. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(a), the trial court committed defendant to the custody 
There is a discrepancy between the sentencing transcript and the written 
sentencing order regarding imposition of the enhancement. The transcript of the 
sentencing hearing reads: "I'm ordering that you serve a[n] indeterminate term, 
on Count I, of 1 to 15 years; Count II, 1 to 15 years; in addition, an enhancement 
of 1 year to 5 years concerning the firearm. They are to run consecutively with 
each other." R.609:7. However, the written sentence and commitment order 
reads "Court order[s] 1-6 years for weapons enhancement." R.539. The 
discrepancy in the written order is a clerical mistake. 
The trial court could not have imposed an additional consecutive sentence 
of 1-6 years as an enhancement. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.8(2) (West 
2004). Rather, the dangerous weapon enhancement statute states that "the court: 
(a)(i) shall increase by one year the minimum term of the sentence applicable by 
law; and (b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable by law 
in the case of a felony of the second or third degree." Id. 
Therefore, the Court's oral pronouncement of sentence is correct. By 
imposing an additional term of one to five years, to run consecutively to the two 
one-to-fifteen year terms, the Court increased the minimum term of defendant's 
manslaughter sentence by one year, and the maximum term by five years. The 
result of the three consecutive sentences is an indeterminate sentence of three to 
thirty-five years. However, defendant will only serve from three to thirty years 
because the maximum aggregate term for defendant's consecutively imposed 
sentences is limited to thirty years. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401 (6)(a) (West 
2004). 
This Court should remand the case after its renders its decision for the trial 
court to correct the clerical error. 
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of the Department of Human Services to be housed at the Utah State Hospital. 
R.609:7. The trial court explained that the decision on whether defendant would 
ultimately be transferred to the prison would be made by the Department of 
Human Services. R.609:7-8. 
Defendant timely appealed. R.540. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
"I killed my mother" 
On 14 December 2001, Michael Gall, defendant's brother, returned home 
around 8:00 p.m. to find his mother's car gone, but her purse on a chair near the 
telephone. R.593:47. As he walked through the house he discovered a bloody ax 
and knife in his mother's bathroom sink. R.593:47. Michael called 911 and two 
officers soon arrived. R.593:48. The' officers discovered Michael's mother in her 
bedroom, lying on her bed, with "multiple incised and chopping injuries" to her 
head and neck. R.593:59. 
Hours later, Officer Duke Steffens discovered defendant near the Sparks 
Farm agricultural facility on the University of Nevada Reno campus. R.593:6-8, 
17. Defendant told Officer Steffens that "he wanted to tell [him] the truth about 
what was going on." R.593:18. 
After being Mirandized and agreeing to talk with Officer Steffens, 
defendant began relating "some elaborate story about Michael Jordan, [and] 
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Quenten Tarantino" and eventually said "that was the reason why I murdered 
my mother." R.593:19. When Officer Steffens asked defendant to clarify, 
defendant said, "Well, I didn't want her to go to the torture chambers. She was 
going to be tortured." R.593:19. Defendant told Officer Steffens that he had 
killed his mother with a hatchet. R.593:19. Defendant was arrested and 
transported to the Washoe County Nevada Detention Center. R.593:20, 35. 
Detective James Schriber spoke with defendant at the detention center. 
R.593:35. Detective Schriber began his questioning by asking if defendant "was 
going to be okay." R.593:37. Defendant responded, "I killed my mother." 
R.593:37. Detective Schriber told defendant to stop talking and advised 
defendant of his Miranda rights. R.593:37. Defendant agreed to continue talking 
to Detective Schriber. R.593:38. 
Defendant told the detective, "Michael Jordan and Quenten Tarantino and 
Adam Sandler were after him and his family to put them in a torture chamber for 
five years." R.593:38. Defendant explained that he had thought about killing 
himself, but decided not to because then there where would be no one left to 
protect his family. R.593:39. Instead, defendant explained that he decided to kill 
his mother and his brother. R.593:39. Defendant confirmed that he had killed his 
mother, but explained that he had not killed his brother because his brother was 
not home at the time. R.593:39. 
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Defendant, who has a history of severe mental illness, had been refusing to 
take his medication for months. R.593:44-45,52-53; 588 (3/25/02 report of Dr. 
Nancy Cohn). For that reason, defendant's mother told him that he could no 
longer live in the family home. R.593:44-45. On the day of the murder, 
defendant visited his mother's home and used the family computer. R.593:45,50, 
63. Before murdering his mother, defendant typed five letters on the computer. 
R.593:50-51. In the letters, defendant discussed the need to kill himself and his 
family to avoid torture chambers. R.593:64-65. 
In his mental health evaluations following his arrest, defendant 
"consistently reported that he thought his mother was going to be put in a 
torture chamber, and he intended to kill her and then himself, in essence, to 
prevent the torture." R.588 (8/26/02 report of Dr. Cohn at 2; see also 4 /4 /02 
report of Dr. Rindflesh; 9/10/02 report of Dr. Rindflesh). 
A history of mental illness, violence, and refusal to take medication 
Defendant has experienced episodes of severe mental illness since 1996. 
R.588 (3/25/02 evaluation of Dr. Cohn). Defendant also has a history of "prior 
aggressive altercations" during these episodes. Id. at 6. For example, in one of 
her evaluations Dr. Cohn noted that defendant "has engaged in physical 
aggression toward his father, made threats to his younger brother, slept with a 
baseball bat" and kept a knife by his bedside. Id. at 4. Dr. Cohn also noted that 
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defendant has a history of conflict with his family members over his "reticence to 
accept treatment and problematic drinking/7 Id. Defendant's mother reported 
an incident where defendant had abused alcohol, became psychotic, and started 
a gasoline fire on the back porch at 2:00 a.m. Id. at 5. Defendant was also 
previously arrested for possession of a firearm. Id. at 6. 
Defendant's delusions included beliefs that "his friends, [and] his 
roommates were coming after him." R.593:56. Defendant also thought that he 
was both Jesus Christ and Satan. R.593:56. Defendant's brother Michael recalled 
defendant taking "a manic trip in his car . . . driving to different cities in 
California without sleeping," and eventually ending up at family member's 
home where he threw a brick at their window. R.593:56. 
Defendant's psychological records indicated that he began to 
decompensate in February of 2001. Id. at 5. Although defendant's family 
"contacted mental health providers with their concerns that he was unstable, and 
delusional. . . defendant presented well enough in clinical interviews to preclude 
involuntary treatment." Id. Defendant's mother made several efforts to have 
mental health providers address defendant's condition. Id. at 6; R.593:54. 
However, defendant would deny his symptoms to treatment providers and none 
found him to be a candidate for civil commitment. Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. This court lacks jurisdiction to review defendant's challenges to his 
guilty and mentally ill pleas on any basis because he did not move to withdraw 
his pleas. Defendant's claims of attorney disloyalty and ineffective assistance of 
counsel do not provide an avenue to reach claims over which this Court has no 
jurisdiction. This Court also lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's not guilty 
by reason of insanity judgment because it was entered as part of the plea 
agreement. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the broader issue of 
defendant's guilty pleas, it necessarily lacks jurisdiction to consider an essential 
part of the plea agreement. 
II. Mr. McCaughey was neither ineffective nor disloyal at sentencing. He 
pursued a reasonable strategy that significantly reduced defendant's potential 
prison time from life, to a maximum of thirty years, and also ensured that 
defendant would receive treatment. Contrary to defendant's understanding, he 
wilf not have to serve thirty years at the Utah State Hospital before he can be 
considered for release or parole. 
Mr. McCaughey was not disloyal because he termed a section 402 
reduction motion frivolous. Rather, he was fulfilling his ethical responsibilities 
by doing so. Given the circumstances of this case, such a motion was frivolous. 
In any event, Mr. McCaughey made the motion and the trial court considered it. 
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III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's 
section 402 reduction motion because the record demonstrates that the trial court 
did consider defendant's evidence regarding the iatrogenic nature of his mental 
illness. 
IV. Any error in the lack of an inquiry regarding defendant's letter 
discharging Mr. McCaughey was harmless because defendant's complaints do 
not rise to the level of a conflict of interest or a complete breakdown in 
communication. In fact, although he wrote a letter discharging Mr. McCaughey 
before sentencing, defendant did not object to Mr. McCaughey's representation 
at sentencing. 
V. The Court should not review defendant's unpreserved challenges to 
Utah's confinement regime for mentally ill offenders because he does not argue 
that any exception to the preservation rule should apply. In any event, the 
claims fail on their merits because they are based on the erroneous premise that 
defendant must serve thirty years at the Utah State Hospital before he can be 
considered for any type of release. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANTS CHALLENGES TO HIS GUILTY AND 
MENTALLY ILL PLEAS BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS 
NEVER MOVED TO WITHDRAW THOSE PLEAS2 
Defendant claims that his guilty and mentally ill pleas are invalid because 
they resulted from attorney "disloyalty/' Aplt. Br. at 13-16. He attacks the 
validity of the stipulated guilty by reason of insanity judgment on the same 
ground, and also argues that it lacks a factual basis. Aplt. Br. at 16-26. This 
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider these claims because defendant did not move 
to withdraw his pleas. 
Defendant was originally charged with one count each of murder, a first 
degree felony, and theft, a second degree felony. R.4-5. He pled guilty and 
mentally ill to a reduced charge of manslaughter, a second degree felony, 
enhanced by his use of a dangerous weapon, and also to the theft charge. R.502-
08. As a condition of his plea agreement, defendant also stipulated to the entry 
of a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity on a charge of aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony. R.502-08; 608: 19-21. Defendant did not move to 
withdraw his pleas. 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's challenges to his pleas 
because he never filed a motion to withdraw his pleas. See State v. Merrill, 2005 
2
 This point responds to points one and two in defendant's brief. 
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UT 34, % 20, 114 P.3d 585; State v. Lebow, 2006 UT App 27, f 2 (unpublished 
memorandum decision) (a copy of this opinion is attached as Addendum F). If 
defendant wished to challenge his pleas, he was required to file a motion to 
withdraw them before sentencing. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (West 
2004). This time limit is jurisdictional. Merrill, 2005 UT 34 at If 20. 
Consequently, failure to file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
"'extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea on 
appeal/" Id. at f 17 (quoting State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 3, 40 P.3d 630, which 
relied on State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993,995 (Utah 1993)). 
Defendant argues that despite his failure to file a timely motion to 
withdraw his pleas, this Court may still consider his challenges to his pleas 
because: (1) his pleas were the result of his counsel's disloyalty and ineffective 
assistance, and (2) the time limit on motions to withdraw does not apply to the 
not guilty by reason of insanity judgment. Aplt. Br. at 20-21. Both arguments 
fail. 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not allow an appellate court 
to reach an issue over which it lacks jurisdiction. See State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 
392, TfTf 6-8, 40 P.3d 646; Lebow, 2006 UT App 27 at f 2. "Absent a timely motion 
to withdraw a plea, appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider any issue 
attacking the guilty plea itself, including whether a defendant received 
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ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea agreement/7 Lebow, 2006 UT App 27, 
1f 2 (citing Merrill, 2005 UT 34 at %% 17-19 and Mela, 2001 UT App 392 at f If 6-8). 
Defendant appears to argue that his counsel was not merely ineffective, 
but also disloyal, and that this Court may use this disloyalty as a basis to 
invalidate his pleas. Aplt. Br. at 13-16, 21. However, as explained above, failure 
to file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea prevents a defendant from 
challenging his guilty plea on any basis. See Merrill, 2005 UT 34 at ^[f 17-19; 
Reyes, 2002 UT 13 at \ 4. In any event, as explained below, defendant cannot 
demonstrate that Mr. McCaughey was disloyal. Therefore, defendant's 
ineffective assistance/disloyalty claim does not enable this Court to consider his 
challenges to his guilty and mentally ill pleas. 
Nor does the not guilty by reason of insanity judgment allow this Court to 
reach defendant's challenges to his guilty pleas. Defendant argues that "a not 
guilty by reason of insanity judgment entered upon a plea agreement is not a 
guilty plea to which either U.C.A. § 77-13-6 or Merrill apply." Aplt. Br. at 21. He 
then reasons that because this Court has jurisdiction to consider the insanity 
judgment, "jurisdiction is no longer an issue and [this Court] can hear the 
entirety of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, including the validity of the 
guilty plea." Id. 
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Defendant's logic is flawed. This Court cannot examine the insanity 
judgment in isolation because it was an essential condition of the plea agreement. 
R.502-08; 608: 19-21. As defendant admits, his stipulation to the entry of the 
insanity judgment was "part of a 'package deal/" Aplt. Br. at 21. This condition 
of the plea agreement would be invalid only if defendant's pleas were invalid. 
However, as explained, this Court has no jurisdiction to examine the validity of 
defendant's pleas. See Merrill, 2005 UT 34 at 1fIf 17-19; Reyes, 2002 UT 13 at 1f 4. 
Consequently, this Court also lacks jurisdiction to consider the validity of the not 
guilty by reason of insanity judgment. 
II. COUNSEL PROVIDED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AT 
SENTENCING3 
Defendant claims that Mr. McCaughey was disloyal and provided 
ineffective assistance at sentencing because he: "(1) purported to represent 
[defendant] at the sentencing hearing after he had been discharged and 
withdrawn as counsel, (2) failed to make any efforts at all on behalf of 
[defendant] with respect to the sentencing, and (3) termed the offense reduction 
motion frivolous." Aplt. Br. at 27-29. Because defendant also raises his first 
ground as a separate appellate issue in his brief, the State will address that claim 
in point four, below. Defendant's second ground fails because Mr. McCaughey's 
sentencing strategy was reasonable. In fact, it secured defendant a significantly 
3
 This point responds to point 3 in defendant's brief. 
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better outcome than he would have received had he gone to trial. Defendant's 
third ground fails because Mr. McCaughey appropriately recognized that the 402 
reduction motion was frivolous given the circumstances of the crime and the 
significant benefits defendant had already received from the plea agreement. 
Background. On 28 February 2003, Mr. Stephen McCaughey entered his 
appearance for defendant. R.295. Defendant entered his guilty plea on 10 
September 2003 and sentencing was set for 15 March 2004. R.500-01. The trial 
court continued the sentencing to 3 May 2004 to better accommodate Mr. 
McCaughey's schedule. R.514-15. On 18 March 2004 Ms. Susanne Gustin-Furgis 
appeared as co-counsel with Mr. McCaughey. R.522. 
On 23 April 2004, defendant filed a pro se motion to reduce the degree of 
his offenses and a partially completed report of Dr. Ann Blake Tracy opining that 
his mental illness was iatrogenic in nature.4 R.523. On 26 April 2004, defendant 
filed a second letter attaching the completed report of Dr. Tracy.5 R.524. 
Defendant also provided the trial court with a report from Dr. Grace E. Jackson 
opining that his mental illness was iatrogenically induced. R.589. 
4
 "Iatrogenic" means "induced unintentionally by a physician through his 
diagnosis, manner, or treatment/7 Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed. 1989). 
5
 The two versions of Dr. Tracy's report are included in the sealed 
envelope designated R.589. 
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On 26 April 2004, defendant filed a third letter with the court requesting 
that it reduce the degree of his offenses or grant him probation based on the 
iatrogenic nature of his mental illness. R.525-27. Defendant's father also filed a 
letter with the trial court discussing defendant's background and requesting that 
the court consider the iatrogenic nature of defendant's mental illness at 
sentencing. R.528-30. 
Also on 26 April 2004, defendant filed another letter stating that he had 
lost confidence in Mr. McCaughey and requesting that Mr. McCaughey 
withdraw as counsel. R.531. Mr. McCaughey filed a withdraw of counsel the 
next day. R.532. Ms. Susanne Gustin-Furgis, who had entered an appearance as 
co-counsel for defendant, also moved to withdraw as counsel. R.535. Her 
motion explained that "Defendant's father . . . has interfered with the case to the 
point that Steve McCaughey and Ms. Gustin cannot adequately represent 
[defendant]." R.535. 
Sentencing was held on 3 May 2004. R.538. Both Mr. McCaughey and Ms. 
Gustin-Furgis were present to represent defendant. R.538; 609:3. Defendant did 
not object to their presence or to their representation. R.609:3-8. 
Mr. McCaughey informed the trial court that he had received a letter from 
defendant stating "that there had been no motion for a 402 reduction filed in this 
case." R.609:5. Mr. McCaughey explained that he had made a conscious 
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decision not to file such a motion because, in his judgment, it "would really be 
frivolous in light of the circumstances of his case/7 R.609:5. However, "in 
deference" to defendant and his father, Mr. McCaughey orally made the motion 
and asked the court to reduce the two second degree felonies to third degree 
felonies" and to sentence defendant to concurrent sentences of zero to five years 
with any applicable weapons enhancement. R.609:5. Mr. McCaughey stated that 
he thought that "the argument can be made that [given] the circumstances of this 
case, being guilty but mentally ill, that [defendant] deserves the benefit of that 
statute." R.609:5. 
The State objected to the motion on the ground that the circumstances 
were not mitigating and that even though defendant was mentally ill, that did 
not lessen his culpability. R.609:5. The prosecutor then encouraged the trial 
court to sentence defendant to consecutive sentences, one of which carried a 
weapons enhancement. R.609:5. 
The trial court denied the motion for a 402 reduction stating, "[t]his was a 
crime of extreme violence and a 402 reduction is simply out of the question in 
this case." R609:5-6. 
The trial court closed the sentencing hearing by remarking that defendant 
would "be at the Utah State Hospital where [he would] get treatment and be safe 
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for a long period of time. And that's frankly my goal I think for almost 
everybody in this case from the very beginning." R.609:8. 
A. Mr, McCaughey's strategy effectively provided defendant a 
significantly better outcome than he would have received 
had he gone to trial. 
To show that Mr. McCaughey was ineffective, defendant "has the difficult 
burden of showing actual unreasonable representation and actual prejudice." State v. 
Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
688 (1984). When reviewing counsel's performance, "a court must indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). "If a rational basis for counsel's performance 
can be articulated, [this Court] will assume counsel acted competently." State v. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Thus, "an ineffective assistance 
claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be 
surmised from counsel's actions." Id. 
"Given the arduous nature of the defendant's burden, ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims rarely succeed." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance fails because Mr. McCaughey 
pursued a reasonable strategy that provided defendant a significantly better 
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outcome than he would have received had he gone to trial. The plea agreement 
that Mr. McCaughey negotiated on defendant's behalf significantly reduced 
defendant's potential prison time and ensured that he would receive treatment 
for his mental illness. 
Had defendant gone to trial, he faced a significant risk of being convicted 
of the murder charge. His repeated statements to police and mental health 
evaluators that he understood he was killing a human being negated any real 
chance of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. See State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 
359,362 (Utah 1995). 
A murder conviction would have resulted in a sentence of five years to life 
in prison. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-203(1); 76-5-203(3) (West 2004). 
Assuming that defendant was found guilty and mentally ill of murder and 
committed to the State Hospital, he could have been imprisoned for the rest of 
his life if he ever became stable enough to be released from the State Hospital. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16a-202. 
The plea agreement significantly reduced defendant's potential prison 
time. By pleading guilty to two second degree felony charges, defendant 
ensured that he would not spend the rest of his life in prison. Even with 
consecutive sentences, defendant's maximum potential prison time is limited to 
thirty years. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401 (6)(a). 
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The plea agreement also ensured that defendant would receive treatment. 
An insanity judgment requires commitment at the State Hospital if the defendant 
is a danger to himself or others. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16a-302(2) (West 
2004). However, a guilty and mentally ill judgment allows a Court the option of 
committing a mentally ill defendant to the prison, rather than the State Hospital. 
See UTAH CODE A N N . § 77-16a-104(3) (West 2004). 
The practical effect of the plea agreement is that defendant will receive 
treatment at the Utah State Hospital either for the rest of his life, or until he is 
stable enough to be released. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-16a-302, -304 (West 
2004). The State Hospital must review defendant's mental condition at least once 
every six months. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16a-304(l)(a) (West 2004) (requiring 
regular review of mentally ill offenders who are committed based on a not guilty 
by reason of insanity verdict). If defendant is no longer mentally ill, or becomes 
sufficiently stable, he will be released from the State Hospital. See id. at § 77-16a-
304(4). Similar review and release provisions apply to defendants committed to 
the State Hospital on the basis of a guilty and mentally ill judgment. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 77-16a-202, -203, -204. 
If defendant becomes stable enough to be released from the State Hospital 
within thirty years, then he will be transferred to the State Prison to serve the 
remainder of his sentence as determined by the Board of Pardons. See UTAH 
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CODE ANN. §§ 77-16a-203, -204. Defendant receives credit towards his prison 
sentences for all of the time that he serves in the State Hospital. See UTAH ADMN. 
CODER671-205-l(l)(b). 
Thus, the plea agreement reduced defendant's maximum potential prison 
term from life, to thirty years, and also assured him treatment for his mental 
illness. If defendant has not stabilized within thirty years, his further custodial 
status will be determined by the State Hospital, and depend solely on therapeutic 
concerns. Had he been convicted of murder, defendant's custodial status would 
have been determined by the Department of Corrections for the rest of his life, 
and depended, at least in part, on punitive concerns. 
Defendant reasons that he would have received a better outcome had he 
been convicted of murder at trial. Aplt. Br. at 24-26. He asserts that in his 
current situation, the effect of the not guilty by reason of insanity judgment and 
the guilty and mentally ill verdicts requires him to be committed to the Utah 
State Hospital for thirty years before he can be considered for any kind of release. 
Id. He complains that this result is far more severe than he would have received 
had he simply been convicted of murder because, even with a murder 
conviction, he would likely be paroled after serving only sixteen years based on 
the Board of Pardons7 sentencing matrix. Id. 
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Defendant's claim fails because it is based on an erroneous premise. 
Defendant is not required to serve thirty years in the State Hospital before he can 
be considered for release. On the contrary, as explained above, the State Hospital 
is statutorily required to evaluate defendant for release at least once every six 
months. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-16a-203, -304. In fact, the State Hospital has 
already conducted at least two such evaluations since defendant's commitment, 
but both have concluded that defendant is not yet eligible for transfer to the 
prison. R.610, 611. Defendant would be eligible for transfer to the prison if he is 
either no longer mentally ill, the prison can provide adequate care, medication, 
and treatment, or he is sufficiently stabilized that hospitalization is no longer 
necessary. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16a-203(3)(a). Therefore, contrary to 
defendant's assumption, he will not necessarily have to serve thirty years in the 
State Hospital before he can be considered for release. 
Moreover, had defendant gone to trial, he would have most likely been 
found guilty and mentally ill of murder. Given his mental state, the Court would 
have then committed him to the State Hospital, just as it did based on the 
judgments resulting from his plea agreement. Therefore, defendant would be in 
the State Hospital under either scenario. 
But under his scenario, if he were ever stable enough to be released from 
the State Hospital, he would then be subject to the Board of Pardons' jurisdiction, 
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and potential imprisonment, for the rest of his life. Additionally, any 
consideration for parole would be based on the more harsh conviction of a first 
degree felony. 
Conversely, under the plea agreement, should defendant ever become 
sufficiently stable to be released from the State Hospital, his consideration for 
parole will be based on a conviction for a second degree felony, rather than a first 
degree felony. In any event, the Board of Pardons may only keep him in prison 
for a maximum of thirty years, rather than the rest of his life. And, as stated, 
defendant will be given credit on his prison sentence for the time he has spent in 
the State Hospital. See UTAH ADMN. CODE R671-205-l(l)(b). Therefore, there is 
no basis for defendant's claim that the outcome Mr. McCaughey negotiated for 
him "increase[ed] [his] incarceration far beyond what was likely under the 
original charges." Aplt. Br. at 24. 
In sum, Mr. McCaughey pursued a strategy that significantly reduced 
defendant's potential maximum prison time and ensured that he would 
immediately receive treatment for as long as necessary. This was a reasonable, 
and arguably the best, strategy that Mr. McCaughey could have pursued for 
defendant. Consequently, Mr. McCaughey was not ineffective in pursuing this 
strategy. See State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993) f a n 
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ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic 
or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions"). 
B. Mr. McCaughey was not disloyal or ineffective for 
observing that the motion to reduce the degree of offense 
was frivolous. 
Defendant claims that Mr. McCaughey was disloyal and ineffective 
because he "termed the offense reduction motion frivolous/' Aplt. Br. at 16, 27. 
This claim fails because the motion was, in fact, frivolous. 
An attorney is not disloyal to his client when he correctly identifies 
frivolous claims. Rather, an attorney's ethical duties require him to do so. Utah 
R. Prof. Conduct 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not . . . assert or controvert an issue . . . 
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous"). For example, if an 
appellate counsel examines a case and determines that the appellate claims are 
frivolous, "'he should so advise the court.'" State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169 
(Utah 1981) (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)). While 
criminal defendants are entitled to counsel, "[c]ounsel is not required to waste 
the court's time with futile or frivolous motions." United States v. Wright, 573 
F.2d 681, 684 (1* Or. 1978). 
Given the circumstances of defendant's case, a motion to further reduce 
the degree of his convictions was frivolous. As explained above, the plea 
agreement had already reduced the degree of the most serious charge from a first 
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degree felony (murder) to a second degree felony (manslaughter). Defendant 
had committed a serious and extremely violent crime by hacking his mother to 
death with an ax. Defendant also had a history of refusing to submit to 
treatment and committing violence when suffering from his mental illness. Mr. 
McCaughey therefore correctly recognized that there was no non-frivolous 
argument that could have supported an even further reduction in the degree of 
defendant's offenses. 
Nevertheless, out of deference to his client's wishes, Mr. McCaughey did 
make an oral section 402 reduction motion at sentencing. R.609:5. Therefore, Mr. 
McCaughey appropriately balanced his ethical duties with his client's desires. 
His actions were neither disloyal nor ineffective. 
Defendant contends that the trial court's statement that he would be at the 
State Hospital for a long period of time supports his claim that Mr. McCaughey 
was disloyal. Aplt. Br. at 25-26. At the close of the sentencing hearing, the trial 
court remarked that defendant would "be at the Utah State Hospital where [he 
would] get treatment and be safe for a long period of time." R.609:8. The trial 
court added, "And that's frankly my goal I think for almost everybody in this 
case from the very beginning." R.609:8. Defendant argues that the trial court's 
statement is evidence that it was also Mr. McCaughey's goal that defendant be 
confined at the State Hospital. Aplt. Br. at 26. Defendant's claim fails. 
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The trial court's remarks do not evidence disloyalty by Mr. McCaughey. 
The conclusion that the trial court was including Mr. McCaughey within its 
statement is mere speculation. In any event, assuming that Mr. McCaughey's 
goal was in fact to have defendant committed to the State Hospital (where he 
would "get treatment and be safe" R.609:8), that was a reasonable strategy that 
served defendant's best interests, as explained above. 
Finally, defendant suggests that the affidavits submitted in support of his 
rule 23B motion for a remand on ineffective assistance of counsel claims provide 
additional evidence of Mr. McCaughey's disloyalty. Aplt. Br. at 15 n.20,16 n.21, 
22-23. However, this Court may not consider rule 23B affidavits as substantive 
evidence on appeal. See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
("We consider affidavits supporting Rule 23B motions solely to determine the 
propriety of remanding ineffective assistance of counsel claims for evidentiary 
hearings"). Therefore, defendant presents the Court with no additional, non-
speculative evidence that would support a claim of disloyalty. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO 
REDUCE THE DEGREE OF HIS OFFENSES6 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to 
reduce the degree of his offenses because it failed to consider the iatrogenic 
6
 This point responds to point 4 in defendant's brief. 
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nature of his mental illness. Aplt. Br. at 29-34. He argues that this was a legally 
relevant factor that the trial court was required to consider at sentencing. Id. 
Defendant's claim fails because the record demonstrates that the trial court did 
consider his evidence regarding the alleged iatrogenic nature of his mental 
illness. 
Section 76-3-402(1) reads: 
If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the 
offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history 
and character of the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh 
to record the conviction as being for that degree of offense 
established by statute and to sentence the defendant to an 
alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402(1) (West 2004). 
A trial court has '"wide latitude and discretion"' in making sentencing 
decisions, including ruling on a 402 reduction motion. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 
t 31, 25 P.3d 985 (quoting State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997)) 
(affirming the denial of a rule 402 reduction motion). "An abuse of discretion 
results when the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or if the 
sentence imposed is clearly excessive/7 State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 
(Utah 1990)). Defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that the trial court did 
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not consider the relevant factors. See State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,1fIf 16-17, 40 P.3d 
626. 
Defendant argues that section 76-3-402 required the trial court to consider 
the "'nature and circumstances of the offense'" and "'the history and character of 
the defendant/" Aplt. Br. at 33 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402(1)). He 
complains that the trial court did not consider his history and character, because 
its only stated reason for denying his 402 motion was that he had committed "a 
crime of extreme violence." R.609:5-6. 
Defendant implies that the trial court's lack of additional explicit findings 
regarding his character and history demonstrate the trial court's failure to 
consider these factors. But, a lack of explicit findings regarding sentencing 
factors does not demonstrate failure to consider those factors. See Helms, 2002 UT 
12 at m 16-17. Rather, Utah appellate courts "'uphold[] the trial court even if it 
failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume 
that the court actually made such findings.'" Id. (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 
P.2d 1219,1234 (Utah 1997)). 
Here, it is reasonable to assume that the trial court considered defendant's 
claims regarding the iatrogenic nature of his psychosis because the trial court 
stated that it had read the reports regarding defendant's mental health. The 
record included two versions of a report by Dr. Ann Blake Tracy, and another by 
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Dr. Grace E. Jackson, regarding the alleged iatrogenic nature of defendant's 
mental illness. R.589. The record also contained three letters from defendant 
and one from his father asking the trial court to consider the issue. R.523, 524, 
525-27, 528-30. The trial court stated that it had "received and reviewed 15 
letters, as well as numerous documents concerning mental health issues with 
regard to the defendant/7 R. 609:5. Therefore, the record demonstrates that the 
trial court did consider the alleged iatrogenic nature of defendant's mental 
illness. 
Moreover, the cause of defendant's mental illness was marginally relevant 
at best. Presumably, no one chooses to be mentally ill. Therefore, defendant's 
claim that his mental illness is iatrogenically induced does not distinguish him 
from any other mentally ill offender. Nor does it lessen his culpability. 
Regardless of the cause of his mental illness, the trial court was faced with 
a mentally ill defendant who had committed an extremely violent crime, and had 
already received a significant benefit from the plea bargain. Moreover, 
defendant had a history of violence and refusing treatment for his mental illness. 
Given those circumstances, and the fact that the trial court specifically stated that 
it had reviewed "the numerous documents concerning mental health issues with 
regard to the defendant," R. 609:5, it is reasonable to assume that the trial court 
fully considered defendant's history and character before denying his rule 402 
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motion. See Helms, 2002 UT 12 at [^16. Therefore, defendant has not shown that 
the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion. See id. at \ 8. 
IV. ANY ERROR IN FAILING TO INQUIRE REGARDING 
DEFENDANT'S DESIRE TO TERMINATE MR. 
McCAUGHEY'S REPRESENTATION WAS HARMLESS7 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to inquire into his 
dissatisfaction with Mr. McCaughey at the sentencing hearing, and by allowing 
Mr. McCaughey to continue to represent him. Aplt. Br. at 34-36. He contends 
that Mr. McCaughey should not have been allowed to represent him at 
sentencing because he had previously discharged Mr. McCaughey and Mr. 
McCaughey had also filed a withdrawal of counsel. Id. Defendant asserts that 
Mr. McCaughey's continued representation prejudiced him because Mr. 
McCaughey undermined the 402 reduction motion by calling it frivolous, and 
did not argue the evidence regarding the iatrogenic nature of his mental illness. 
Id. Defendant also argues that Mr. McCaughey's continued representation 
prevented him from moving to withdraw his guilty pleas. Id. 
Defendant cites State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f 27, 984 P.2d 382, to support 
his claim that the trial court had a duty to inquire into his dissatisfaction with 
Mr. McCaughey. However, Lovell involved the issue of dissatisfaction with 
appointed counsel. See id. at ^ 11, 27-35. Mr. McCaughey was retained counsel. 
7
 This point responds to point 5 in defendant's brief. 
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R.295, 362. Therefore, Lovell does not apply. In any event, assuming arguendo 
that the trial court had a duty to inquire into defendant's apparent dissatisfaction 
with his retained counsel, defendant cannot demonstrate that the trial court's 
failure to do so was harmful. 
"'[W]hen a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, a trial court 
'must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of 
the defendant's complaints.'" Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at Tf 27 (quoting State v. Pursifell, 
746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Failure to do so is error. Id. However, 
the error is harmful only if defendant can demonstrate that he would have been 
entitled to appointed substitute counsel had the trial court inquired. Id. at |1f 29-
31. "It is well established that to warrant substitution of counsel, a defendant 
'must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in 
communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust 
verdict.'" Id. at f 31 (quoting United State v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 
1973)). Here, defendant's complaints with counsel do not rise to this level. 
Most significantly, as in Lovell, defendant did not object to Mr. 
McCaughey's continued representation. R.609:3-8; Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at \ 32. 
Although defendant filed a letter with the trial court the week before sentencing 
asking that Mr. McCaughey withdraw because defendant had "lost confidence" 
in him, defendant did not object when Mr. McCaughey actually represented him 
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at sentencing. That silence gives rise to a reasonable inference that defendant 
and Mr. McCaughey reconciled their differences before sentencing. 
The record supports that inference. Defendant's chief concern with Mr. 
McCaughey's continued representation was apparently Mr. McCaughey's 
reluctance to make a 402 reduction motion. R.609:5. However, Mr. McCaughey 
made an oral 402 reduction motion at sentencing and explained that he was 
doing so "in deference" to defendant and his father. R. 609:5. Therefore, the 
record supports the inference that defendant and Mr. McCaughey had settled 
any disagreement before sentencing. 
Moreover, defendant's complaints about Mr. McCaughey's terming the 
402 reduction motion frivolous and failing to argue the alleged iatrogenic nature 
of his mental illness do not rise to "a constitutional level requiring the 
appointment of new counsel." See Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at f^ 31. Neither complaint 
alleges a conflict of interest or a complete breakdown in communication. See id. 
In any event, as explained above, Mr. McCaughey correctly termed the 402 
motion frivolous and the trial court considered the evidence regarding the 
alleged iatrogenic nature of defendant's mental illness. Therefore, neither claim 
demonstrates prejudice. 
Defendant also complains that Mr. McCaughey's continued representation 
at sentencing prevented him from moving to withdraw his guilty and mentally 
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ill pleas. Aplt. Br. at 35. Again, this complaint, even if true, is insufficient to 
demonstrate prejudice because it does not allege a conflict of interest or a 
complete breakdown in communication. See Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at ^ 31. 
In any event, no evidence supports this claim of prejudice. Nothing in the 
record supports defendant's allegation that he wanted to withdraw his guilty 
before sentencing. Most significantly, defendant makes no allegation in his rule 
23B motion that he had asked Mr. McCaughey to file a motion to withdraw his 
guilty and mentally ill pleas and that McCaughey had refused to do so. See 
Defendant's Motion for Remand Under Rule 23B, filed 22 August 2005. 
Additionally, assuming that defendant did want to withdraw his pleas, the 
record demonstrates that he knew how to contact the trial court and could have 
filed a pro se motion to withdraw his pleas. Defendant had filed several 
documents with the court pro se, including a section 402 reduction motion. 
R.523,524,525-27. 
In sum, defendant fails to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the 
trial court's failure to inquire into any dissatisfaction that he may have had with 
Mr. McCaughey. Therefore, any error in failing to inquire is harmless. See Lovell, 
1999 UT 40 at 1^27-35. 
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V. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
UNPRESERVED CHALLENGES TO THE CONFINEMENT 
REGIME FOR MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS BECAUSE HE 
DOES NOT ARGUE THAT ANY EXCEPTION TO THE 
PRESERVATION RULE SHOULD APPLY8 
Defendant argues that Utah's confinement regime for mentally ill 
offenders is unconstitutional as applied to him and also violates the Americans 
with Disabilities Act. Aplt. Br. at 36-39. The Court should not consider these 
issues because they are unpreserved and defendant argues no exception to the 
preservation rule. 
"[I]n general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including 
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court 
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances/' State v. 
Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 13, 95 P.3d 276 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 10 
P.3d 346). A party seeking review of an unpreserved issue must "articulate the 
justification for review in the party's opening brief." State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, 
t 45, 114 P.3d 551 (citing Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, f 9, 17 P.3d 1122). 
When a party fails to do so, an appellate court may refuse to consider the 
unpreserved issue. Id. at ^ 50, 58 (refusing to consider Pinder's unpreserved 
claims because he "failed to argue plain error or show exceptional circumstances 
on appeal"). 
8
 This point responds to points 6 and 7 of defendant's brief. 
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This Court should not consider defendant's unpreserved claims because he 
fails to argue that any exception to the preservation rule should apply. In the 
"Statement of the Issues Presented" section of his brief, defendant does mention 
that "this Court will review an issue not properly preserved if the appealing 
party can demonstrate plain error or exceptional circumstances" or ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Aplt. Br. at 4. However, defendant never analyzes how 
those doctrines might apply to these issues. Therefore, defendant's claims are 
inadequately briefed and this Court should decline to address them. See State v. 
Norris, 2004 UT App 452, f^ 6 n.2 (unpublished memorandum decision) 
("Defendant mentions plain error in a single paragraph, but fails to apply plain 
error doctrine to any of the specific issues raised. Thus, we do not address 
Defendant's plain error argument because it is inadequately briefed") (a copy of 
this unpublished decision is attached as Addendum G). 
In any event, defendant's claims fail on their merits because they are based 
on the premise that he must serve thirty years in the State Hospital before he can 
be considered for release. Aplt. Br. at 36, 38. As explained above, this premise is 
incorrect. Therefore, defendant's unpreserved claims fail on their merits. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Court should affirm defendant's convictions 
and sentence. 
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76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of 
which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for 
that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant to an 
alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to be for a 
class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor and the 
sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class A 
misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his probation; 
and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and a 
hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the interest of 
justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the 
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense may be 
reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this section by more 
than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtaining or 
being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law. 
(5) Judgment for a conviction for a lower degree of offense may not be entered if 
there remains any unpaid balance on court ordered restitution for the offense for which 
the reduction is sought. 
(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section: 
(a) a person required to register as a sex offender under Section 77-27-21.5 is not 
eligible to obtain a reduction of the conviction that requires the person to register 
as a sex offender: 
(i) while under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections; or 
(ii) until the registration requirements under Section 77-27-21.5 have expired; 
and 
(b) a person required to register as a sex offender for the person's lifetime under 
Subsection 77-27-21.5(10)(c) may not be granted a reduction of the conviction for 
the offense or offenses that require the person to register as a sex offender. 
Amended by Chapter 50, 2006 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 189,2006 General Session 
77-16a-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the Board of Pardons and Parole established under Section 77-27-
2. 
(2) "Department" means the Department of Human Services. 
(3) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Department of Human 
Services. 
(4) "Mental health facility" means the Utah State Hospital or other facility that 
provides mental health services under contract with the division, a local mental health 
authority, or organization that contracts with a local mental health authority. 
(5) "Mentally ill" means the same as that term is defined in Section 76-2-305. 
(6) "Mentally ill offender" means an individual who has been adjudicated guilty and 
mentally ill, including an individual who is mentally retarded. 
(7) "Mentally retarded" means the same as the term "mental retardation", defined in 
Section 62A-5-101. 
(8) "UDC" means the Department of Corrections. 
Amended by Chapter 13,1994 General Session 
77-16a-102. Jury instructions. 
(1) If a defendant asserts a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall 
instruct the jury that it may find the defendant: -
(a) guilty; 
(b) guilty and mentally ill at the time of the offense; 
(c) gunt}' o: „ .esser offense; 
(d) guilty of a lesser offense and mentally ill at the time of the offense; 
(e) not guilty by reason of insanity; or 
( v i . ^ b u i l v - ' • 
(2) (a) When a defendant asserts a mental defense pursuant to Section 76-2-305 or 
asserts special mitigation reducing the level of an offense pursuant to Section 76-5-205.5, 
or when the evidence raises the issue and either party requests the Instruction, the jury 
shall be instructed that if it finds a defendant guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of any charged offense or lesser included offense, it shall also return a special verdict 
indicating whether it finds that the defendant was mental1** ill at tb*s f,'™e ^f fhe offen se 
(b) If the jury finds the defendant guilty of the charged offense by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and by special verdict finds the defendant was mentally ill at 
the time of the offense, it shall return the general verdict of "guilty and mentally 
ill at the time of the offense." 
(c) If the jury finds the defendant guilty of a lesser offense by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and by special verdict finds the defendant was mentally ill at 
the time of the offense, it shall return the general verdict of "guilty of a lesser 
offense and mentally ill at the time of the offense." 
. (d) if the jury finds the defendant guilty oi the aiar 0ed oiieiibe or1 a lesser 
included offense and does not find that the defendant was mentally ill at the time 
of the offense, the jury shall return a verdict of "guilty" of that offense, along with 
the special verdict form indicating that the jury did not find the defendant 
mentally ill at the time of the offense. 
(e)' The special verdict siuni he i^iuii^d L>) mc jui) at the same time as tl te 
• general verdict, to indicate the basis for its general verdict. 
(3) In determining whether a defendant should be found guilty and mentally ill at 
the time of the offense, the jury shall be instructed that the standard of proof applicable 
to a finding of mental illness is by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury shall also 
be instructed that the standard of preponderance of the evidence does not apply to the 
elements establishing a defendant's guilt, and that the proof of the elements establishing 
a defendant's guilt of any offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Amended by Chapter 61, 2002 General Session 
77-16a-103. Plea of guilty and mentally ill at the time of the offense. 
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill at the time of the offense being tendered by 
a defendant to any charge, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to 
determine whether the defendant is currently mentally ill. 
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant, and may receive 
the testimony of any public or private expert witness offered by the defendant or the 
prosecutor. The defendant may be placed in the Utah State Hospital for that 
examination only upon approval by the executive director. 
(3) (a) A defendant who tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill at the time of the 
offense shall be examined first by the trial judge, in compliance with the standards for 
taking pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be advised that a plea of guilty and mentally 
ill at the time of the offense is a plea of guilty and not a contingent plea. 
(b) If the defendant is later found not to be currently mentally ill, that plea 
remains a valid plea of guilty and mentally ill at the time of the offense, and the 
defendant shall be sentenced as any other offender. 
(4) If the court concludes that the defendant is currently mentally ill his plea shall be 
accepted and he shall be sentenced in accordance with Section 77-16a-104. 
(5) (a) When the offense is a state offense, expenses of examination, observation, and 
treatment for the defendant shall be paid by the department. 
(b) Travel expenses shall be paid by the county where prosecution is 
commenced. 
(c) Expenses of examination for defendants charged with violation of a municipal 
or county ordinance shall be paid by the municipality or county that commenced 
the prosecution. 
Amended by Chapter 61,2002 General Session 
77-16a-104. i erdict of guilty and mentally ill -- Hearing to determine present mental 
state. 
(1) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill for the offense charged, or any lesser 
offense, the court shall conduct a hearing t-o determine the defendant's present mental 
state. 
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant to determine his 
mental condition, and may receive the evidence of any public or private expert witness 
offered by the defendant or the prosecutor. The defendant may be placed in the Utah 
State Hospital for that examination only vvtw approve] nf *hp .wmt ivp rtWprtnr 
(3) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is currently 
mentally ill, it shall impose any sentence that could be imposed under law upon a 
defendant who is not mentally ill and who is convicted of the same offense, and: 
(a) commit hiii 11: :> tl te iepartn Lei i t ii i accordance i; \ ill: i, the pro^ • isions of Section 
77-16a-202, if: 
(i) the court gives the department the opportunity to provide an evaluation 
and recommendation under Subsection (4); and 
(ii) the c :: m ii I: find s by clear ai id c :>i i v' i i i c ing e v i d e i ice t h a t : • • - .'• ... . :: • 
(A) because of his mental illness the defendant poses an immediate 
physical danger to self or others, including jeopardizing his own or others' 
safety, health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or probation setting, or 
lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, 
•clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation- -md 
(B) the department is able to provide the defendant with treatment, care, 
custody, and security that is adequate and appropriate to the defendant's 
conditions and needs; 
(v •• der probation in accordani * v< * ." : 
(c) if the court determines that commitment to the department under Subsection 
(3)(a) or probation under Subsection (3)(b) is not appropriate, the court shall 
place the defendant in the custody of UDC or a county jail as allowed by law. 
^ ^
 o r c | e r t Q | n s u r e j j ^ thg requirements oi Subseaiun yo)\a) di. ua/ cum L 
shall, prior to making a determination, notify the executive director oi Hit* proposed 
placement and provide the department with an opportunity to evaluate the defendant 
and make a recommendation to the court regarding placement prior to commitment. 
(5) If the court finds that the defendant is not currently mentally ill, it shall sentence 
the defendant as it would any other defendant. 
(6) Expenses for examinations ordered under this section shall be paid in accordance 
with Subsection 77-16a-103(5). 
Amended by Chapter 206,2003 General Session 
77-16a-201. Probation. 
(1) (a) In felony cases, when the court proposes to place on probation a defendant 
who has pled or is found guilty and mentally ill at the time of the offense, it shall 
request UDC to provide a presentence investigation report regarding whether 
probation is appropriate for that defendant and, if so, recommending a specific 
treatment program. If the defendant is placed on probation, that treatment program 
shall be made a condition of probation, and the defendant shall remain under the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b) The court may not place an offender who has been convicted of the felony 
offenses listed in Section 76-3-406 on probation, regardless of whether he is or 
has been mentally ill. 
(2) The period of probation for a felony offense committed by a person who has been 
found guilty and mentally ill at the time of the offense may be for no less than five 
years. Probation for those offenders may not be subsequently reduced by the sentencing 
court without consideration of an updated report on the mental health status of the 
defendant. 
(3) (a) Treatment ordered by the court under this section may be provided by or 
under contract with the department, a mental health facility, a local mental health 
authority, or, with the approval of the sentencing court, any other public or private 
mental health provider. 
(b) The entity providing treatment under this section shall file a report with the 
defendant's probation officer at least every six months during the term of 
probation. 
(c) Any request for termination of probation regarding a defendant who is 
receiving treatment under this section shall include a current mental health 
report prepared by the treatment provider. 
(4) Failure to continue treatment or any other condition of probation, except by 
agreement with the entity providing treatment and the sentencing court, is a basis for 
initiating probation violation hearings. 
(5) The court may not release a mentally ill offender into u\ n* - : 
probation, if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that he: 
(a) poses an immediate physical danger to himself or others, including 
jeopardizing his own or others' safety, health, or welfare if released into the 
community; or 
(b) lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, 
and shelter, if released into the community 
(6) A mentally ill offender who is not eligible for release into the community under 
the provisions of Subsection (5) may be placed by the court, on probation, in an 
appropriate mental health facility. • -
Amended by Chapter 61, 2002 General Session 
77-16a-202. Person found guilty and mentally ill — Commitment to department — 
Admission totJtah State Hospital. 
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally ill offender to the department under 
Subsection 77-16a-104(3)(a), the court shall: 
(a) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be 
committed to the department and admitted to the Utah State Hospital for care 
and treatment until transferred to UDC in accordance with Sections 77-16a-203 
and 77-16a-204, making provision for readmission to the Utah State Hospital 
whenever the requirements and conditions of Section 77-16a-204 are met; or 
(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be 
committed to the department for care and treatment for no more than 18 months, 
or until the offender's condition has been stabilized to the point that commitment 
to the department and admission to the Utah State Hospital is no longer 
necessary to ensure adequate mental health treatment, whichever occurs first. At 
the expiration of that time, the court may recall the sentence and commitment, 
and resentence the offender. A commitment and retention of jurisdiction under 
this Subsection (l)(b) shall be specified in the sentencing order. If that 
specification is not included in the sentencing order, the offender sha 1; be 
committed in accordance with Subsection (l)(a). 
(2) The court may not retain jurisdiction, under Subsection (l)(b), over the sentence 
of a mentally ill offender who has been convicted of a capital felony. In capital cases, the 
court shall make the findings required by this section after the capital sentencing 
proceeding mandated by Section 76-3-207. 
(3) When an offender is committed to the department and admitted to the Utah State 
Hospital under Subsection (l)(b), the department shall provide the court with reports of 
the offender's mental health status every six months. Those reports shall be prepared in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 77-16a-203. Additionally, the court may 
appoint an independent examiner to assess the mental health status of the offender. 
(4) The period of commitment to the department and admission to the Utah State 
Hospital, and any subsequent retransfers to the Utah State Hospital made pursuant to 
Section 77-16a-204 may not exceed the maximum sentence ifriposed by the court. Upon 
expiration of that sentence, the administrator of the facility where the offender is 
located may initiate civil proceedings for involuntary commitment in accordance with 
Title 62A, Chapter 5, Services to People with Disabilities, or Title 62A, Chapter 15, 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Act. 
Amended by Chapter 8,2002 Special Session 5 
77-16a-203. Review of offenders with a mental illness committed to department — 
Recommendations for transfer to Department of Corrections. 
(1) (a) The executive director shall designate a review team of at least three qualified 
staff members, including at least one licensed psychiatrist, to evaluate the mental 
condition of each mentally ill offender committed to it in accordance with Section 77-
16a-202, at least once every six months. 
(b) If the offender is mentally retarded, the review team shall include at least one 
individual who is a designated mental retardation professional, as defined in 
Section 62A-5-101. 
(2) At the conclusion of its evaluation, the review team described in Subsection (1) 
shall make a report to the executive director: 
(a) regarding the offender's: 
(i) current mental condition; 
(ii) progress since commitment; and 
(iii) prognosis; and 
(b) that includes a recommendation regarding whether the mentally ill offender 
should be: 
(I) transferred to UDC; or 
(ii) remain in the custody of the department. 
(3) (a) Ihe executive director shall notity the UDL medical administrator, and the 
board's mental health adviser thai a mentally ill offender is eligible for transfer to UDC 
if the review team finds that the offender: 
(i) is no longer mentally ill; or 
(ii) is still mentally ill and may continue to be a danger to himself or others, 
but can be controlled if adequate care, medication, and treatment are 
provided by UDC; and 
(iii) the offender's condition has been stabilized to the point that commitment 
to the department and admission to the Utah State Hospital are no longer 
necessary to ensure adequate mental health treatment. 
(b) The administrator ot the mental health facility where the offender is located 
shall provide the UDC medical administrator with a copy of the reviewing staff's 
recommendation and: 
(i) all available clinical tacts; 
(II) tin1 (liiii^nosjs; 
(iii) the course of treatment received at the mental health facility; 
(iv) the prognosis lor remission ot symptoms; 
(v) the potential for recidivism; 
(vi) an estimation of the offender's dangerousness, either to himself or others; 
and 
(\ 11) ieu>iiiniendiituiiic Im hi l im IriMtinrnt. 
Amended by Chapter 61, 2005 General Session 
77-16a-204. UDC acceptance of transfer of guilty and mentally ill persons — 
Retransfer from UDC to department for admission to the Utah State Hospital. 
(1) The UDC medical administrator shall designate a transfer team of at least three 
qualified staff members, including at least one licensed psychiatrist, to evaluate the 
recommendation made by the department's review team pursuant to Section 77-16a-
203. If the offender is mentally retarded, the transfer team shall include at least one 
person who has expertise in testing and diagnosis of mentally retarded individuals. 
(2) The transfer team shall concur in the recommendation if it determines that UDC 
can provide the mentally ill offender with adequate mental health treatment. 
(3) The UDC transfer team and medical administrator shall recommend the facility in 
which the offender should be placed and the treatment to be provided in order for his 
mental condition to remain stabilized to the director of the Division of Institutional 
Operations, within the Department of Corrections. 
(4) In the event that the department and UDC do not agree on the transfer of a 
mentally ill offender, the administrator of the mental health facility where the offender 
is located shall notify the mental health adviser for the board, in writing, of the dispute. 
The mental health adviser shall be provided with copies of all reports and 
recommendations. The board's mental health adviser shall make a recommendation to 
the board on the transfer and the board shall issue its decision within 30 days. 
(5) UDC shall notify the board whenever a mentally ill offender is transferred from 
the department to UDC. 
(6) When a mentally ill offender sentenced under Section 77-16a-202, who has been 
transferred from the department to UDC, and accepted by UDC, is evaluated and it is 
determined that the offender's mental condition has deteriorated or that the offender 
has become mentally unstable, the offender may be readmitted to the Utah State 
Hospital in accordance with the findings and procedures described in Section 62A-15-
605.5. 
(7) Any person readmitted to the Utah State Hospital pursuant to Subsection (6) shall 
remain in the custody of UDC, and the state hospital shall act solely as the agent of 
UDC. 
(8) A mentally ill offender who has been readmitted to the Utah State Hospital 
pursuant to Subsection (6) shall be transferred back to UDC in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 77-16a-203. 
Amended by Chapter 8,2002 Special Session 5 
77-16a~205. Parole. 
(1) When a mentally ill offender who has been committed to the department becomes 
eligible to be considered for parole, the board shall request a recommendation from the 
executive director and from UDC before placing the offender on parole. 
(2) Before setting a parole date, the board shall request that its mental health adviser 
prepare a report regarding the mentally ill offender, including: 
(,i) a l l ,j\/ai]ciMlt" i ln i iK. i l Lit Is, •• 
(b) the diagnosis; 
(c) the course of treatment received at the mental health facility; 
•• ' ' • (d) tl t,e progi Losis for ren rissic i L of symptoms; 
(e) potential for recidivism; 
(f) .an estimation of the mentally ill offender's dangerousness either to himself or 
others; and 
. • (g) r e c o m n v s-.i !A*'ons '»• 4 v.itmmt. 
(3) Based on the report described in Subsection (2), the board may place the mentally 
ill offender on parole. The board may require mental health treatment as a condition of 
parole. If treatment is ordered, failure to continue treatment, except by agreement with 
the treatment provider, and the board, is a basis f ^  ^ t i n ' V n of parole violation 
hearings by the board. 
(4) UDC, through Adult Probation and Parole, shall monitor the status of a mentally 
ill offender who has been placed on parole. UDC may provide treatment by contracting 
with the department, a local mental health authority, any other public or private 
provider, or in~house staff. 
(5) The period of parole may be no less than five years, or until expiration of the 
defendant's sentence, whichever occurs first. The board may not subsequently reduce 
the period of parole without considering an updated report on the offender's current 
mental condition. 
77-16a-301. Mental examination of defendant 
(1) (a) When the court receives notice that a defendant intends to claim that he is not 
guilty by reason of insanity or that he had diminished mental capacity, or that he 
intends to assert special mitigation under Section 76-5-205.5, the court shall order the 
Department of Human Services to examine the defendant and investigate his mental 
condition. 
(b) The person or organization directed by the department to conduct the 
examination shall testify at the request of the court or either party in any 
proceeding in which the testimony is otherwise admissible. 
(c) Pending trial, unless the court or the executive director directs otherwise, the 
defendant shall be retained in the same custody or status he was in at the time 
the examination was ordered. 
(2) (a) The defendant shall make himself available and fully cooperate in the 
examination by the department and any other independent examiners for the defense 
and the prosecuting attorney. 
(b) If the defendant fails to make himself available and fully cooperate, and that 
failure is established to the satisfaction of the court at a hearing prior to trial, the 
defendant is barred from presenting expert testimony relating to his defense of 
mental illness at the trial of the case. 
(c) The department shall complete the examination within 30 days after the 
court's order, and shall prepare and provide to the court prosecutor and defense 
counsel a written report concerning the condition of the defendant. 
(3) Within ten days after receipt of the report from the department, but not later than 
five days before the trial of the case, or at any other time the court directs, the 
prosecuting attorney shall file and serve upon the defendant a notice of rebuttal of the 
defense of mental illness, which shall contain the names of witnesses the prosecuting 
attorney proposes to call in rebuttal. 
(4) The reports of any other independent examiner are admissible as evidence upon 
stipulation of the prosecution and defense. 
(5) This section does not prevent any party from producing any other testimony as 
to the mental condition of the defendant. Expert witnesses who are not appointed by 
the court are not entitled to compensation under Subsection (7). 
(6) This section does not require the admission of evidence not otherwise admissible. 
(7) Expenses of examination ordered by the court under this section shall be paid by 
the Department of Human Services. Travel expenses associated with the examination 
incurred by the defendant shall be charged by the department to the county where 
prosecution is commenced. Examination of defendants charged with violation of 
municipal or county ordinances shall be charged by the department to the entity 
commencing the prosecution. 
Amended by Chapter 2,1999 General Session 
77-16a-302. Persons found not guilty by reason of insanity — Disposition. 
(1) Upon a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall conduct a 
hearing within ten days to determine whether the defendant is currently mentally ill. 
The defense counsel and prosecutors may request further evaluations and present 
testimony from those examiners. 
(2) After the hearing and upon consideration of the record, the court shall order the 
defendant committed to the department if it finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that: 
(a) the defendant is still mentally ill; and 
(b) because of that mental illness the defendant presents a substantial danger to 
himself or others. 
(3) The period of commitment described in Subsection (2) may not exceed the period 
for which the defendant could be incarcerated had he been convicted and received the 
maximum sentence for the crime of which he was accused. At the time that period 
expires, involuntary civil commitment proceedings may be instituted in accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 15, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Act. 
Amended by Chapter 8, 2002 Special Session 5 
77-16a-303. Court determinations. 
After entry of judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall: 
(1) determine on the record the offense of which the person otherwise would have 
been convicted and the maximum sentence he could have received; and 
(2) make specific findings regarding whether there is a victim of the crime for which 
the defendant has been found not guilty by reason of insanity and, if so, whether the 
victim wishes to be notified of any conditional release, discharge, or escape of the 
defendant. 
Enacted by Chapter 171,1992 General Session 
77-16a-304. Review after commitment. 
(1) (a) The executive director, or the executive director's designee, shall establish a 
review team of at least three qualified staff members to review the defendant's mental 
condition at least every six months. 
(b) The team described in Subsection (l)(a) shall include: 
(i) at least one psychiatrist; and 
(ii) if the defendant is mentally retarded, at least one staff member who is a 
designated mental retardation professional, as defined in Section 62A-5-101. 
(2) If the review team described in Subsection (1) finds that the defendant has 
recovered from the defendant's mental illness, or, that the defendant is still mentally ill 
but does not present a substantial danger to himself or others, the executive director, or 
the executive director's designee, shall: 
(a) notify the court that committed the defendant that the defendant is a 
candidate for discharge; and 
(b) provide the court with a report stating the facts that form the basis for the 
recommendation. 
(3) (a) The court shall conduct a hearing within ten business days after receipt of the 
executive director's, or the executive director's designee's, notification. 
(b) The court clerk shall provide notice of the date and time of the hearing to: 
(i) the prosecuting attorney; 
(ii) the defendant's attorney; and 
(iii) any victim of the crime for which the defendant was found not guilty by 
reason of insanity. 
(4) (a) The court shall order that the defendant be discharged from commitment if 
the court finds that the defendant: 
(i) is no longer mentally ill; or 
(ii) is mentally ill, but no longer presents a substantial danger to himself or 
others. 
(b) The court shall order the person conditionally released in accordance with 
Section 77-16a-305 if the court finds that the defendant: 
(i) is still mentally ill; 
(ii) is a substantial danger to himself or others; and 
(iii) can be controlled adequately if conditionally released with treatment as a 
condition of release. 
(c) The court shall order that the commitment be continued if the court finds that 
the defendant: 
(i) has not recovered from his mental illness; 
(ii) is a substantial danger to himself or others; and 
(iii) cannot adequately be controlled if conditionally released on supervision. 
(d) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(d)(ii), the court may not discharge a 
defendant whose mental illness is in remission as a result of medication or 
hospitalization if it can be determined within reasonable medical probability that 
without continued medication or hospitalization the defendant's mental illness 
will reoccur, making the defendant a substantial danger to himself or others. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (4)(d)(i), the defendant described in 
Subsection (4)(d)(i) may be a candidate for conditional release, in accordance 
with Section 77-16a-305. 
Amended by Chapter 61,2005 General Session 
77-16a-305. Conditional release. 
(1) If the review team finds that a defendant is not eligible for discharge, in 
accordance with Section 77-16a-304, but that his mental illness and dangerousness can 
be controlled with proper care, medication, supervision, and treatment if he is 
conditionally released, the review team shall prepare a report and notify the executive 
director, or his designee, that the defendant is a candidate for conditional release. 
(2) The executive director, or his designee, shall prepare a conditional release plan, 
listing the type of care and treatment that the individual needs and recommending a 
treatment provider. 
(3) The executive director, or his designee, shall provide the court, the defendant's 
attorney, and the prosecuting attorney with a copy of the report issued by the review 
team under Subsection (1), and the conditional release plan. The court shall conduct a 
hearing on the issue of conditional release within 30 days after receipt of those 
documents. 
(4) The court may order that a defendant be conditionally released if it finds that, 
even though the defendant presents a substantial danger to himself or others, he can be 
adequately controlled with supervision and treatment that is available and provided for 
in the conditional release plan. 
(5) The department may provide treatment or contract with a local mental health 
authority or other public or private provider to provide treatment for a defendant who 
is conditionally released under this section. 
Amended by Chapter 285,1993 General Session 
77-16a~306. Continuing review — Discharge. 
(1) Each entity that provides treatment for a defendant committed to the department 
as not guilty by reason of insanity under this part shall review the status of each 
defendant at least once every six months. If the treatment provider finds that a 
defendant has recovered from his mental illness, or if still mentally ill, no longer 
presents a substantial danger to himself or others, it shall notify the executive director 
of its findings. 
(2) Upon receipt of notification under Subsection (1), the executive director shall 
designate a review team, in accordance with Section 77-16a-304, to evaluate the 
defendant. If that review team concurs with the treatment provider's assessment, the 
executive director shall notify the court, the defendant's attorney, and the prosecuting 
attorney that the defendant is a candidate for discharge. The court shall conduct a 
hearing, in accordance with Section 77-16a-302, within ten business days after receipt of 
that notice. 
(3) The court may not discharge an individual whose mental illness is in remission as 
a result of medication or hospitalization if it can be determined within reasonable 
medical probability that without continued medication or hospitalization the 
defendant's mental illness will reoccur, making the defendant a substantial danger to 
himself or others. 
Enacted by Chapter 171,1992 General Session 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
R671-201. Original Parole Grant Hearing Schedule and Notice. 
R671-201-1. Schedule and Notice. 
Within six months of an offender's commitment to prison the Board will give notice 
of the month and year in which the inmate's original hearing will be conducted. A 
minimum of one week (7 calendar days) prior notice should be given regarding the 
specific day and approximate time of such hearing. 
All felonies, where a life has been taken, will be routed to the Board as soon as 
practicable for the determination of the month and year for their original hearing date. 
The Board will only consider information available to the court at the time of 
sentencing. All first degree felonies, where death is not involved, will be eligible for a 
hearing after the service of three years. All second degree felonies, where death is not 
involved, will be eligible for a hearing after the service of six months unless the second 
degree is a sex offense and in those cases will be eligible for a hearing after the service 
of eighteen months. 
All third degree felonies, where a death is not involved, and all class A 
misdemeanors, will be eligible for a hearing after the service of three months unless the 
third degree felony is a sex offense and in those cases will be eligible for a hearing after 
the service of twelve months. 
Excluded from the above provisions are inmates who are sentenced to death or life 
without parole. 
An inmate may petition the Board to calendar him/her at a time other than the 
usual times designated above or the Board may do so on its own motion. A petition by 
the inmate shall set out the special reasons which give rise to the request. The Board 
will notify the petitioner of its decision in writing as soon as possible. 
Annotations 
References: 71-17-7. 
R671-205. Credit for Time Served. 
R671-205-1. Policy. 
(1) Credit for time served will be granted against the expiration date on a crime of 
commitment when: 
(a) a conviction is set aside and there is a subsequent commitment for the same 
criminal conduct; 
(b) a commitment is made to the Utah State Hospital pursuant to a "guilty and 
mentally ill" conviction; 
(c) time is spent in custody outside the State of Utah based solely on the Utah 
warrant; 
(d) the Board deems such credit just under the circumstances; or 
(e) credit is otherwise required by law. 
(2) No credit will be given for time spent in custody at the Utah State Hospital or 
comparable non-prison, psychiatric facility while the offender is judicially-declared 
incompetent. 
(3) If no record of official detention time is found in the Board file, the Board will 
presume that none was served. In cases where the offender desires credit, the burden is 
on the offender to request it and to provide copies of records supporting the claim of 
time spent in custody. 
Annotations 
References: 77-27-7, 77-27-9, 77-19-7. 
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JUDGE JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
I, Leonard Preston Gall, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and 
that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty and mentally ill to the following crimes: 
Degree Crime and Statutory 
Provision 
Manslaughter, U.C.A § 76-5-205, 
with dangerous weapon enhancement, 
U.C.A. § 76-3-203 









2 years to 15 years prison, may be 
2 years to 20 years; $10,000 
fine plus 85% surcharge 
1 to 15 years prison; $10,000 
fine plus 85% surcharge 
In addition, I am stipulating that the Court will enter judgment of "not guilty by reason of 
insanity," on a charge of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony under U.C.A. § 76-6-203. I 
acknowledge and certify my understanding that under this "not guilty by reason of insanity" 
judgment, I am subject, in addition to the criminal penalties for my above-described "guilty and 
mentally ill" pleas, to commitment to the Utah Department of Human Services for involuntary 
mental health treatment; further, that the period of such commitment may, under U.C.A. 77-16a-
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302, extend for a period of five years to life, subject to periodic review by the trial court. 
I have received a copy of the Amended Information against me. I have read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the nature and elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
and mentally ill. 
Factual Basis for Pleas 
The elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty and mentally ill are: 
Manslaughter: that on or about December 14, 2001, at 2925 East 2965 South, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, I did recklessly cause the death of my mother, Susan Gall, 
and that I used a dangerous weapon to do so. 
Theft of Automobile: that on or about December 14, 2001, at 2925 East 2965 South, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, I did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the 
operable motor vehicle of my mother, Susan Gall, with the purpose to deprive her of that 
automobile. 
I understand that by pleading guilty and mentally ill I will be admitting that I committed 
the crimes listed above. I stipulate that the following facts describe the conduct for which I am 
criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the trial court to accept my guilty and mentally 
ill pleas and prove the elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty and mentally ill: 
At the above-described place and time, I was suffering from a serious mental illness, and 
for several months I had not been taking the medication prescribed to control the symptoms of 
my illness. By refusing to take my prescribed medications, I acted recklessly. As a result, I was 
experiencing delusions caused by my mental illness, and acting upon those delusions, I attacked 
my mother in her bedroom with a knife and a hatchet, killing her. I then took her automobile, 
eventually driving it to Reno, Nevada, where I was arrested about two days later. 
These facts also create a substantial risk, were this case to proceed to trial, that I would be 
found guilty of criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony as charged in the originally-filed 
Information in this Court, as well as theft of an automobile. I am entering into this plea 
agreement, in part, to avoid this risk. 
Factual Basis for Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Judgment 
I understand that aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, occurs when a person enters 
or remains unlawfully in the dwelling of another, with the intent to commit an assault on any 
person, and uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person who 
is not a participant in the crime. Based upon the report of an expert witness, retained by the 
defense in this case, a question has been raised about the content of my delusional thinking at the 
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time that I killed my mother; in particular, the question is whether I had the intent to assault or 
kill another human being. I understand that based upon the existence of this question, the 
prosecution has agreed to the "not guilty by reason of insanity" judgment on this charge. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas, and consenting to the "not guilty by reason of insanity" 
judgment, voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the constitutions of 
Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty and mentally ill I will give 
up all the following rights: 
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
service to me. 
I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is Stephen R. McCaughey. My 
attorney and I have folly discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty 
and mentally ill pleas, along with the consequences of the "not guilty by reason of insanity" 
judgment. 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury, and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty and mentally ill. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, 
a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me, and; b) my 
attorney would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against 
me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses if I 
chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of 
those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those 
costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, 
no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold that choice against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I 
am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crimes. If I choose to 
fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At 
a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charges beyond a 
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reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each 
juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty and mentally ill, I give up the presumption of innocence 
and will be admitting that I committed the crimes stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty and mentally ill. I understand that if I wish to appeal my 
sentence I must file a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days after my sentence is entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty and mentally ill, I am waiving and giving 
up all the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty And Mentally 111 Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that maybe imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty and mentally ill. I know that my sentence may include a prison 
term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crime(s), which 
include my mother's immediate family. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time (concurrently). 
Plea Agreement. My guilty and mentally ill pleas, and the entry of the "not guilty by 
reason of insanity" judgment, are the result of a plea agreement between my attorney, in full 
consultation with me, and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of 
the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
Upon the entry of my guilty and mentally ill pleas as stated above, the State will 
recommend that I be committed to the Utah State Hospital for evaluation and treatment, 
with periodic review by the trial court, until commitment to the State Hospital is no 
longer clinically necessary. At the end of that time, the trial court will sentence me, on 
the "guilty and mentally ill" pleas to counts I and II of the Amended Information, within 
the maximum terms elsewhere set forth in this Statement. 
I also reiterate my understanding and agreement that regardless of the terms and duration 
of my ultimate criminal sentence under my guilty and mentally ill pleas, I will remain 
-4-
legally committed for involuntary mental health treatment, under the trial court's ongoing 
jurisdiction, for a period extending beyond my criminal sentence, and which could 
continue for the rest of my life, with regular review by the trial court. 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession, or any 
sentencing recommendation, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting 
attorney, or jointly recommended by the defense and the prosecution, are not binding on the 
judge. I also know that any opinions counsel express to me as to what they believe the judge may 
do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering these pleas of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty and mentally ill. No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am 26 years of age. I have attended school through bachelor's degree. University of 
Utah. I can read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty and 
mentally ill. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which 
impair my judgment. Instead, I have been taking the medication prescribed for my mental 
illness, enabling me to freely, rationally, and voluntarily enter into this plea agreement. 
Based upon my current compliance with my prescribed treatment, I believe myself to be 
of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding these proceedings and 
the consequences of my guilty and mentally ill pleas, as well as the consequences of the "not 
guilty by reason of insanity" judgment. I am not currently suffering from an impairment that 
would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily entering my pleas. 
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty and mentally ill pleas, I must file 
a written motion to withdraw my pleas before sentence is announced. I will only be allowed 
to withdraw my guilty and mentally ill pleas if I prove that they were not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge to my pleas made after sentencing must 
be pursued under the Post Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this / a day of Z^^JL. , 2003. 
EFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for Leonard Preston Gall, the defendant above, and that I 
know he has read the statement or that I have read it to him; I have discussed it with him and 
believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically 
competent to proceed with the plea agreement described herein. To the best of my knowledge 
and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime and the factual synopsis 
of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing Statement, are accurate 
and true. 
McCAUGHEY < ^ 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Utah State Bar No. 2149 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against Leonard Preston 
Gall defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual bases for 
the defendant's criminal conduct constituting the offenses are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea have been directed toward defendant. The 
plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the Plea Agreement, or as 
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supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
prosecution evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offenses for which the 
pleas are entered, or for the greater offense of criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony, as 
well as motor vehicle theft. Finally, in light of this defendant's well-documented prior history of 
serious mental illness, and upon consultation with and the consent of the victim's family, I 
believe that the acceptance of the pleas would serve the public interest. 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
DEPUTY DISTRICT. 
Bar No. 5768 
TTORNEY 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty and mentally ill pleas are freely, knowingly, and 
voluntarily made. The Court further finds that the defendant has freely, knowingly, and 
voluntarily agreed that a judgment of "not guilty by reason of insanity" will be entered on a 
charge of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty and mentally ill pleas to the 
crimes set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered, and that judgment of "not guilty by 
reason of insanity" on aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, is also entered. 
DATED this /& day of September, 2003. 
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 1 0 ; 2 0 0 3 ; 10 :10 A.M. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: All right. Let's take the matter of 
State of Utah versus Leonard Preston Gall, Case No. 011919226. 
Will counsel state their appearances. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Steve McCaughey for the defendant. 
MR. MURPHY; Kevin Murphy and Anne Cameron for the 
State. 
(The defendant comes into the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey, this is Mr. Gall with you 
at the podium? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: It is, your Honor. Can we have his 
hand uncuffed, please? 
THE COURT: Which hand does he write with? 
THE DEFENDANT: My right hand. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. McCaughey, have you 
received a copy of the Amended Information that has been filed 
by the State in this case? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I have. That!s the one Mr. Gall and 
I have discussed this morning, and we talked about earlier, 
that includes Count III, an Aggravated Burglary. And it also 
includes Count I, which was the Criminal Homicide and now is a 
reduction down to Manslaughter, a Second, which was a First 
Degree Homicide. And it includes a Theft. I have received it 
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and we have gone over it. 
THE COURT: All right. And the proposed disposition 
in this case? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, it is that — the 
proposed disposition is that Mr. Gall will enter a plea of 
guilty but mentally ill to Count II and to Count I; and that 
the Court, based on certain reports and factual statements, 
will enter and find him not guilty by reason of insanity on 
the Count III, which is Aggravated Burglary. 
THE COURT: Mr. Murphy, is that your understanding of 
the disposition in this case? 
MR. MURPHY: It is, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have you spoken with the family of the 
victim, Mrs. Gall, about the disposition? 
MR. MURPHY: I have, your Honor. Two of the family 
members are here. And this disposition has also been reviewed 
very carefully by the administration of the District 
Attorney!s Office. 
THE COURT: Is this disposition, with regard to all 
three counts, acceptable to the victim's family? 
MR. MURPHY: My understanding from them over the past 
several weeks is that it is. 
THE COURT: All right. 
And Mr. McCaughey, you have spoken with Mr. Gall at 
some length, I understand, with regard to entering the pleas 
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of guilty and mentally ill. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Mr. Gall and I have discussed the 
case in general ever since I have been retained by him, which 
was several months ago. But, particularly in the last month 
since we've had negotiations, serious negotiations, plea 
negotiations with the District Attorney's Office, he and I 
have spoke on several occasions and at length regarding this 
possible plea and its benefits. So, yes. 
THE COURT: You believe Mr. Gall is prepared to go 
forward this morning with this? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I think he is. 
THE COURT: All right. 
All right. Mr. Gall, you are now charged by an 
Amended Information with Criminal Homicide Manslaughter, a 
Second Degree Felony, at 2925 East 2965 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about December 14th of 2001. The 
allegation is that you, a party to the offense, did recklessly 
cause the death of Susan Gall. Further, that a dangerous 
weapon, or a facsimile of a dangerous weapon, or the 
representation of a dangerous weapon, was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the Criminal Homicide 
Manslaughter, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by 
7 6-3-203, Utah Code Annotated. 
You1re also charged with Theft, a Second Degree 
Felony, at 2925 East 2965 South, in Salt Lake County, State of 
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Utah, on or about December 14th of 2001. The allegation is 
that you, a party to the offense, obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the operable motor vehicle of Susan 
Gall with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
Mr. Gall, is it your intention to plead guilty and 
mentally ill to these two charges today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gall, are you under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Do you take prescription medication? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. What is your medication, Mr. Gall; 
what do you take? 
THE DEFENDANT: I!m taking Wellbutrin, trazodone, 
lithium, propanolol and Risperdal. 
THE COURT: And this is medication that has been 
prescribed to you because of your diagnosis of schizophrenia; 
is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: It was prescribed for manic-
depression. 
THE COURT: Okay. And there was a diagnosis both of 
bipolar disorder then and schizophrenia; is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Schizo-affective disorder, from 
the psychiatrist that came to the jail. 
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THE COURT: Okay. And you have been in custody now, 
Mr. Gall, since January 16th of last year; is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Uh. . . 
THE COURT: That's what my records show. It!s an 
extended period of time, about 18 months; is that right? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that's correct. I was in 
custody in Reno starting December 16th. 
THE COURT: Right. Then you were transferred here to 
Salt Lake on the 16th of January, right? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: During that period of time, have you been 
maintaining these medications in the jail? Have you been 
taking all of these medications in the jail that have been 
prescribed to you? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you have taken them in recent days as 
well, continuously? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. And you have taken your most 
recent dosage of those medications? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is there anything about those many 
medications that you take that would interfere with your 
ability to understand the proceedings in court today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Do you have either a mental or a physical 
condition that would interfere with your ability to understand 
these proceedings? 
THE DEFENDANT: Uh, while I'm on the medication, I'm 
able to proceed with it. But I suppose with my mental 
illness, I maybe would not. 
THE COURT: All right. One of my jobs today, 
Mr. Gall, is to make sure you understand everything that's 
happening. And the very significant factors involved in this 
case relate to your severe mental illness. 
And these medications have been prescribed to you so 
that you can become competent to understand things and to 
carry on. And you have indicated to me already that you have 
taken all these medications and you have taken them regularly 
for a very long period of time. 
Notwithstanding the recognized mental illness that 
you suffer from, do you believe you understand what's going on 
in court today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Uh, yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey, I'll ask you these same 
questions essentially. You have been counsel for Mr. Gall for 
a rather extended period of time, some six months or so, at 
this point. And you have had an opportunity to visit Mr. Gall 
many times, including in recent days. Do you believe that he 
is competent and understands the proceedings and can knowingly 
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and intelligently go forward with these pleas today? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I do, your Honor. I have observed 
Mr. Gall over a period of six months now. And I have observed 
an improvement in his cognitive ability, his ability to 
understand what's going on, in his relationship with me. Itfs 
been a positive improvement all along. 
And he and I have talked at length about what we're 
doing here. And I believe he has a good grasp of whatTs going 
on and I believe he understands everything. 
THE COURT: Is there any reason that you believe we 
should not go forward today with the acceptance of these 
pleas? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: No, there's not. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gall, are you able to 
read the English language? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: How much schooling have you had? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I graduated from college with 
a bachelors. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you have got a bachelors 
degree? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to read a 
statement of the constitutional rights you give up by entering 
a plea? 
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THE DEFENDANT: What was that again? 
THE COURT: Did you read that document — 
Mr, McCaughey there has a rather lengthy document — 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
THE COURT: — that explains in written form all the 
constitutional rights you give up by entering a plea of 
guilty. Have you had an opportunity to read that document? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Did you also have an opportunity to speak 
with Mr. McCaughey about the constitutional rights you give up 
by entering a plea? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Did you also speak with him about the 
basis of these charges, the possible penalty, and the nature 
of these allegations against you? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you feel like you need any more time 
to speak with Mr. McCaughey? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: And, Mr. Gall, are you satisfied with the 
representation hefs given you in this case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Mr. McCaughey, you have previously stated that you 
believed that Mr. Gall is capable of going forward this 
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morning. And he!s indicated he has reviewed his rights with 
you; is that correct? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: He has. 
THE COURT: Do you believe he understands the 
constitutional rights that he gives up? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I believe he does. 
THE COURT: Do you believe also that he understands 
the possibilities with regard to sentencing in this case? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I do. Wefve gone over the sentencing 
possibilities: Consecutive versus concurrent, credit for time 
served, where he is going to be housed, et cetera. We have 
gone over that extensively and I believe he understands. 
THE COURT: All right. Will you then give me the 
factual basis supporting each of these charges. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, on December 14th of 2001, 
at the address stated in the Information, Mr. Gall entered his 
house, his motherfs house, with the intent to -- or remained 
in his mother's house with the intent to commit a felony. At 
that time he recklessly caused her death. And, after that, he 
took the car and then went to Reno. 
Those are the factual bases that led to the charges 
and to the two guilty pleas. I think that there is a 
different factual basis that leads to not guilty by reason of 
insanity, but those are the facts for the first two. 
THE COURT: I!11 speak about that a little later. 
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MR. McCAUGHEY: Okay. 
THE COURT: The allegation also — that is, with 
regard to the Manslaughter charge -- is that he used a 
dangerous weapon when he caused the death of his mother, Susan 
Gall. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I believe the evidence will show that 
that involved an axe, possibly a knife, but at least an axe. 
THE COURT: And that was what caused her death; is 
that correct? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Right. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gall, is that what you did? 
THE DEFENDANT: Uh, yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that that is the 
conduct you are admitting to by entering a plea of guilty 
today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that you1 re admitting 
to having killed your mother in this manner, and also you're 
admitting to stealing this car and, in fact, taking the car 
for several days, ultimately being picked up in Reno, Nevada? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand that the 
disposition in this case anticipates that you will enter a 
plea of guilty and mentally ill to this charge? 
I want to make sure you understand that a plea of 
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guilty and mentally ill is a plea of guilty to the charge. 
It's not contingent upon anything that might happen in the 
future. 
As part of this type of a plea, I will ask for some 
mental health evaluations. I will consider them. But, 
regardless of the outcome, what I will look at is what your 
mental state is currently, your mental health issues 
currently. 
If I find that you1re not mentally ill at the 
present time, that doesn't make any difference with regard to 
the entry of this plea. You're entering a plea of guilty, and 
you will be sentenced in some manner reflecting your guilt in 
this matter. 
Do you understand that this is not going to be 
removed in any way, this plea? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: No one told you anything other than that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: No one did? You understand that this is 
an absolute plea and it's not going to change? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. What I am really going to be 
looking at is more toward where you will be living, where you 
will be placed. I will not be looking at a modification of 
the guilty plea itself. 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any questions about that, 
Mr. Gall? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: All right. I want to make sure that you 
also understand that you are giving up your right to go to 
trial. We had a trial set in this case, set for, in fact, all 
of next week. You!re giving up your right to bring your own 
witnesses, the right to confront witnesses against you. 
If you go to trial, you are presumed innocent. You 
don't have to testify against yourself nor prove your 
innocence. The burden is upon the State of Utah to prove each 
element of each of these charges beyond a reasonable doubt. 
You have a right to a speedy trial; that is, you 
have a constitutional right to have this case move with due 
speed through the court system. You have a right to an 
attorney throughout the proceedings. 
You have a right to a jury trial. The jury must be 
composed of a panel of impartial jurors. It must be a 
unanimous verdict before you can be convicted. 
And you have a right to appeal the conviction. Your 
right to appeal a plea of guilty is much more limited. 
Mr. Gall, do you understand that that is the case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand also that those are 
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constitutional rights you give up by entering a plea? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Let's talk a little bit about sentencing. 
I want to explain to you the maximum sentences for these 
offenses. 
The Second Degree Felony Manslaughter can carry with 
it an indeterminate term at the Utah State Prison of one to 15 
years, a fine of $10,000 plus an 85 percent surcharge. That 
changes when there is the addition of a dangerous weapon 
enhancement. And that means that I can order that you serve 
up to two years to 15 years at the Utah State Prison or even 
two years to 20 years at the Utah State Prison for the 
manslaughter conviction. 
With regard to the Theft, a Second Degree Felony, I 
can order that you serve an indeterminate term at the Utah 
State Prison of one to 15 years, pay a fine of $10,000 plus an 
85 percent surcharge. 
Mr. Gall, I want you to understand also that, with 
regard to sentencing, all sentencing decisions are my 
decisions. I have spoken extensively with the attorneys in 
this case and will continue to do so. I have reviewed mental 
health records and will continue to do so. I want you to 
understand that they are very much a part of the sentencing 
and the disposition in this case. 
But, ultimately, the person who makes all decisions 
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with regard to sentencing is me. I am the one who will be 
doing that. I am not bound to accept recommendations. I will 
be the one that will make all decisions with regard to 
sentencing, including whether any commitments I may order will 
run concurrently — that is, at the same time as each other --
or consecutively — one after another. 
I will make a determination, in large part, about 
where you are going to be housed. I anticipate that, for an 
extended period of time, you will be housed at the Utah State 
Hospital. But, again, I am the one who makes that 
determination and I will do so when I receive the necessary 
information from the State Hospital, itself, as well as other 
mental health evaluations. 
Do you understand that I am the one who is making 
those decisions? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Did anyone tell you anything other than 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Did anyone promise you any kind of 
treatment from the Court, anything, so that you would enter 
this plea? 
THE DEFEXJDRNT: Would you say that again? 
THE COURT: Did anyone make any promises to you, 
particularly about what I might do by way of sentencing? 
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MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, I did indicate to 
Mr. Gall that we had spoken with you and it was your 
indication that you did not intend to impose a fine in this 
case. The decision had not been made, but that was your 
initial impression based on where he was going to be. 
THE COURT: ThatT s correct. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Other than that, has there been any 
promises made? 
THE DEFENDANT: Uh, no. 
THE COURT: And you understand I will make a decision 
with regard to the fine. But, at this point, it's frankly 
unlikely that I will impose a fine in this case. But, then 
again, I will make that decision at the time of sentencing, 
make that determination at the time of sentencing. Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Gall, has anyone threatened 
you so that you would enter a plea today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Has anyone forced you in any way? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Has anyone compelled you in any way to 
enter this plea today, these two pleas today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Are you doing this of your own free will? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And are you doing it because you 
committed these two offenses? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions that I can 
answer for you now, Mr. Gall? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I! 11 ask that you sign that statement 
now. 
(The defendant signs his Statement of Defendant.) 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Did you want to go into the not 
guilty by reason of insanity? 
THE COURT: No. I will do that later. 
I have before me now a statement that has been 
signed by the defendant and by counsel. 
Mr. Gall, how then do you plead to the charge of 
Criminal Homicide Manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony, at 
2925 East 2965 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
or about December 14th of 2001, the allegation being that you 
recklessly caused the death of Susan Gall; further, that you 
used a dangerous weapon, or a facsimile of a dangerous weapon, 
or the representation of a dangerous weapon, in the commission 
of this criminal homicide? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty and mentally ill. 
THE COURT: And how do you plead to the charge of 
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Theft, a Second Degree Felony, at 2925 East 2965 South, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December 14th of 2001, 
the allegation being that you exercised unauthorized control 
over the operable motor vehicle of Susan Gall with the purpose 
to deprive the owner thereof? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty and mentally ill. 
THE COURT: I'll accept both pleas of guilty and 
mentally ill. You have a right to file a motion to withdraw 
these pleas before sentence is announced. I am also now 
signing the Statement of Defendant and I incorporate it into 
the court record. I find the pleas to be knowing, intelligent 
and voluntary this morning. 
Letfs move on now to Count III. Count III reads as 
follows: Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony, at 2925 
East 2965 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or 
about December 14th of 2001, the allegation being that 
Mr. Gall, a party to the offense, entered or remained 
unlawfully in the dwelling of Susan Gall, with the intent to 
commit an assault, and was armed with a dangerous weapon, to 
wit: a knife and a hatchet. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: That's fine. 
THE COURT: I believe, by stipulation of the parties, 
you have agreed that I will enter a verdict with regard to 
Count III of not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Mr. McCaughey, is that true? 
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MR. McCAUGHEY: That is, your Honor. And that's 
based on the reports of Dr. Mirow and Dr. Cohn and 
Dr. Rindflesh that have been submitted to this Court over the 
period of this case. 
THE COURT: Mr. Murphy, is the State stipulating to 
this verdict? 
MR. MURPHY: Yes, the State is, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Will you give me a basis for this 
particular disposition? 
MR. MURPHY: As an evidentiary matter, your Honor, 
evidence located by the defense, Mr. McCaughey has called into 
question the precise content of Mr. Gall's delusion at the 
time that he committed these offenses. Based upon that, there 
has been some doubt interjected as to whether he might 
otherwise receive a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict 
were the case to proceed to trial. 
As a practical matter, the not-guilty-by-reason-of-
insanity judgment that you are entering will provide the 
Court, your Honor, with lifetime jurisdiction to supervise 
this defendant, quite apart from the criminal sanctions, and 
to assure that he continues to comply with treatment and to 
protect himself and the public from being dangerous in the 
future. 
THE COURT: And, Mr. Murphy, you stated earlier, in 
general, that the family of Susan Gall have reviewed this 
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entire disposition and were in agreement with it as well. 
MR. MURPHY: ThatTs correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that includes this not-guilty-by-
reason-of-insanity finding by this Court and the entry of that 
verdict? 
MR. MURPHY: ThatTs correct, your Honor. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, if I may. 
Also, part of the reason for entering into this plea 
agreement is that, had this matter gone to trial, we could 
have ended up with the same not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity 
verdict in reference to the homicide charge that we have on 
the aggravated burglary. But we would have been taking a risk 
that Mr. Gall could have been convicted on the First Degree 
Murder charge, which would have resulted in a guilty but 
mentally ill but then would have resulted in a commitment to 
the Utah State Prison for five to life. 
That is something we were, most assuredly, trying to 
avoid. And this plea agreement has allowed us to do that and 
gives us the same benefit that we would have had, had he been 
found not guilty by reason of insanity at trial. 
THE COURT: All right. And I am in agreement with 
the assessment. I have spent a great deal of time on this 
case. And I believe that both the pleas of guilty and 
mentally ill to Counts I and Count II and the verdict of not 
guilty by reason of insanity to Count III are sound and 
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appropriate in this case. 
And I believe it is a disposition that is in the 
best interests of all parties involved, and that includes 
Susan Gallfs family, and also Mr. Gall, Leonard Gall. I 
believe that it is, in fact, the most appropriate disposition 
in this case. 
Mr. Gall, I!m prepared to accept and issue a verdict 
of not guilty by reason of insanity to the charge of 
Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony. I want you to 
understand, Mr. Gall, that the maximum penalty for this 
offense is a commitment of five years to life at the Utah 
State Prison. And by entering this verdict — had you been 
convicted of a first degree felony — 
And by entering this verdict, this Court will 
maintain -- will have the ability to maintain jurisdiction 
over this case, over that count — and that means specifically 
over you — for as long as the prison could have. That means 
up to your entire lifetime. And that's part of what's going 
on with the acceptance of this disposition of not guilty by 
reason of insanity. 
Do you understand that will afford this Court 
lifetime jurisdiction over where you are; do you understand 
that thatT s true? 
THE DEFENDANT: Did you say that I can be at the Utah 
State Prison during this whole time? 
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THE COURT: Not on this charge. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
THE COURT: You can be in the Utah State Prison on 
your pleas of guilty and mentally ill, on those two second 
degree felonies. You cannot be at the Utah State Prison under 
a not guilty verdict. 
But you can and will be under the jurisdiction of 
this Court until this Court relinquishes jurisdiction. And 
this Court has the ability to have jurisdiction -- that is, to 
basically control where you are — for your entire life. Do 
you understand that that's true? 
THE DEFENDANT: I thought after my two — after my 
two one to 15s were done, that I would automatically go to the 
State Hospital. 
THE COURT: That may be the case. Mr. Gall, it's 
hard to predict at this point what's going to happen in what 
could be a 30-year period. 
You cannot spend more than 30 years at the Utah 
State Prison because that's the maximum that I can order a 
prison commitment for on two second degree felonies. Your 
placement after that really is something that's up to me or 
the judge who succeeds me in this position. 
Do you understand that? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: But she can't send you back to the 
prison. You can be in the State Hospital or in some sort of 
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form of conditional release or something like that, but it 
would not be at the prison. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that that's the case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Also, the law does require that I make 
specific findings with regard to the entry of this kind of a 
disposition, whether there is a victim of the crime for which 
I am accepting the verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity, and if the victim wishes to be notified of any 
conditional release, discharge or escape. 
And with regard to the burglary charge, Mr. Murphy, 
I understand the victim is Leonard Gall's brother, Michael. 
MR. MURPHY: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And is it his desire to be notified, 
consistent with the statutory requirements? 
MR. MURPHY: It is, your Honor. And also a close 
family member -- in fact, Susan Gall's brother -- Ted Jenkins 
is also here today. He would also like to receive that 
notification. 
THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: No. 
THE COURT: I believe that is appropriate. And I 
will indicate also that Ted Jenkins wishes to be informed with 
regard to any conditional release, discharge or escape. 
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Upon the acceptance of a verdict of not guilty by 
reason of insanity, the Court must conduct a hearing within 
ten days of today to make a determination of whether Mr. Gall 
is currently mentally ill. I believe that this Court can go 
forward with that hearing today, based on a number of factors, 
The most important and most compelling in my mind is that, 
within the last month, the Court received updates from 
Dr. Nancy Cohn and Dr. Mark Rindflesh, who were the original 
mental health examiners in this case — both of whom did an 
update in August of this year — as well as a brief but 
current report by Susan Mirow. 
Mr. McCaughey, do you feel like, based on that 
current information, I can go forward this morning with that 
hearing? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I do. 
THE COURT: Mr. Murphy? 
MR. MURPHY: The State feels that way as well, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. McCaughey, your proffer with regard to 
Mr. Gallfs mental illness, current mental illness? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I believe, after reading Dr. Mirowfs 
report, and Dr. Rindflesh and Dr. Cohn, I think he still has 
an on-going mental illness. I understand it!s being treated 
with medication but it is still present. And I think that 
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meets the statutory criteria that the Court needs to find. 
THE COURT: Mr. Murphy, are you in agreement with 
that? 
MR. MURPHY: Yes, your Honor. We think he still 
suffers from mental illness. We think that he still poses a 
substantial, if not immediate, threat to himself or others, 
particularly given his history of noncompliance with 
medication when he's not compelled to comply. 
THE COURT: All right. And I am in agreement with 
that, having reviewed all of that documentation. 
With regard to Mr. Gallfs mental illness, I will 
make the following findings: I find then that, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the defendant, Leonard Gall, is 
still mentally ill; and also find by clear and convincing 
evidence that, because of that mental illness, the defendant 
presents a substantial danger to himself or others. 
On that basis, Mr. Gall, I am ordering your 
commitment under the verdict of not guilty and mentally ill to 
the Utah State Hospital. 
With regard to Counts I and Count II, the guilty and 
mentally ill sentences, the statute requires that, prior to 
sentencing under those provisions, I notify the Director of 
the Department of Human Services about this verdict, or the 
acceptance of these pleas, and permit her -- to give her 
notice, and permit her and her department at the Utah State 
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Hospital to examine Mr. Gall prior to sentencing on this case. 
I believe that can be done at the State Hospital. 
I will request the Director of Human Services to 
permit that evaluation to be done at the Utah State Hospital. 
I don!t anticipate any difficulties with that, based on the 
fact that I have ordered Mr. Gall to be housed at the Utah 
State Hospital under the other provision. 
Mr. McCaughey, Mr. Murphy, we talked a few moments 
ago in chambers and talked about setting the sentencing out 
approximately six months so that Mr. Gall can have a 
sufficient time at the Utah State Hospital to be thoroughly 
evaluated by the psychiatrists at the Utah State Hospital. 
Is that your request then, Mr. Murphy? 
MR. MURPHY: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And Mr. McCaughey, as you know, Mr. Gall 
has a right to be sentenced on these cases between two days 
from now and 45 days from now. I can set the sentencing out 
longer if you agree to that. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: We will waive the time for 
sentencing, your Honor, as long as it's clear that we will be 
arguing for credit for time served from today, the date that 
he entered his plea at least, and also from the time he 
started to serve his time in the jail when he was booked into 
jail. But, at least, I want that clear, that thatTs the basis 
that we're waiving it is that we have the right to ask for 
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credit for time served. 
THE COURT: And, certainly, as I indicated earlier, I 
will listen to arguments and recommendations with regard to 
sentencing. But, again, I am the one who is going to make the 
decision in that regard. 
Mr. McCaughey, you certainly are aware of that. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I understand that, your Honor. But, 
just for the record, we do desire that he be evaluated at the 
Utah State Hospital. 
THE COURT: That then will be my order. Let's get a 
sentencing date in early March. 
How about the 15th of March? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: The Ides of March. 
THE COURT: The Ides of March. You can remember it 
that way. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: What time? 
THE COURT: 2 o'clock. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: That's all right. 
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Murphy? 
MR. MURPHY: Yes. Michael Gall, the defendant's 
brother, is here. He has asked leave to be heard by the Court 
now that the plea has been entered. And I will tell you also 
that he is going to be asking that a no-contact order be 
entered between the defendant and himself. 
THE COURT: I certainly think that's appropriate. 
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ThatT s something I can order at the present time. 
Any objection to Mr. Gall speaking now, 
Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: No. May we be excused while that 
happens? 
THE COURT: I'll actually ask that you go over by the 
jury box so that Mr. Gall can speak. And Leonard Gall, if you 
will go over with your attorney. 
Are you Michael Gall? 
GENTLEMAN SPEAKING: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. And you wish to say something 
then? 
GENTLEMAN SPEAKING: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
GENTLEMAN SPEAKING: Here? 
THE COURT: Yeah. You can just stand right there. 
No, you don't have to go on the witness stand. 
GENTLEMAN SPEAKING: Right here. Okay. 
Umm, I know that I will speak again at the 
sentencing hearing. But I just wanted to say, umm, first off, 
I still love my brother, umm, but I don't understand why he 
took our mom's life. She was always good to him. 
Umm, I also want to say that he has given a lot of 
pain to me and to my family. But I forgive him. I don't have 
any anger towards him. 
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But the only person I really have any anger against 
is my father. And I know my father. If he wasn't like the 
way he was, maybe none of this would have happened. 
I don't blame my brother, I donft. The most person 
I blame is my father. And I would -- I love my brother. But 
I never want to see my father again. That's all. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Gall. 
Mr. McCaughey, if you and Mr. Gall will come back 
for a moment to the podium. 
I intend to recess court in a few moments. But 
also, before doing that, I will say a few words about this 
case. 
This case, from beginning to end, is a tremendous 
tragedy for everybody involved — for the Gall family, for the 
community. I never met Susan Gall. But I have read some of 
her words and I have heard about her from people. Her loss 
and the circumstances of her death are as tragic as any that 
we can see in a court. 
Mr. Gall, with regard to your life now and the past 
year and a half and in the future, it's hard to imagine the 
horror you must live in on a daily basis, having taken the 
life of your mother and the pain that your family members feel 
as a result of this. It has caused larger pain, though, also 
through this entire community. 
The community in Utah has responded to this. The 
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legislature has passed legislation that hopefully will prevent 
this type of a situation from ever happening again. 
Mr. Gall, you suffer from an extreme mental illness, 
a mental illness that you cannot control, and that one of the 
symptoms is not taking medications. It goes along with the 
mental illness, and that!s typical. 
And what that has left us with is a community with 
the obligation of caring for people in your situation — or 
not the "obligation." It leaves the question up of that. 
And our community has not, in the past, taken steps 
to be actively involved in the lives of people such as you. 
In retrospect, we would all like to look back and say, maybe 
if Leonard Gall had stayed on his medications, maybe if we had 
resources for him, maybe if the family was able to somehow get 
him some help, all of this wouldn't have happened. 
And maybe all of that's true. But that didn!t 
happen. And we are left here today having to recognize the 
horror and the tragedy that your conduct and your life and the 
circumstances have resulted in. 
I have no answers with regard to those issues, 
Mr. Gall. But I can tell you that they're of a daily concern 
to me and to many people in this community. 
With that, Mr. McCaughey, I appreciate your work on 
this case. 
Mr. Murphy, Ms. Cameron. 
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We'll be in recess. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
(These proceedings concluded at 10:53 a.m.) 
• * * 
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THE COURT: All right, let!s take the matter of State 
of Utah versus Leonard Preston Gall, case number 011919226. 
Will Counsel state their appearances. 
MS. GUSTIN: Suzanne Gustin — sorry, Steve. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Go ahead. 
MS. GUSTIN[: Suzanne Gustin for Mr. Gall. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Steven McCaughey for Mr. Gall. 
MS. CAMERON: Anne Cameron for the State. 
THE COURT: The record should reflect that Mr. Gall 
is present also in the courtroom. This is the time set for 
sentencing. Mr. Gall entered pleas of guilty to second 
degree — guilty and mentally ill to a second degree 
manslaughter charge and a second degree theft charge. I 
committed Mr. Gall to the Utah State Hospital sometime ago, 
last September I believe it was, with regard to the third first 
degree felony count. I set this matter for sentencing at that 
point for Mr. Gall to have some time to be at the Utah State 
Hospital and also to receive an update from the State Hospital. 
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And I have received one dated the 18 of February. 
Are you prepared to go forward with sentencing on the 
other two cases now, Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I am. 
THE COURT: Ms. Cameron? 
MS. CAMERON: Your Honor, it would be — we've had 
quite a bit of testimony. I don't think that any -- the 
victims are present. Do you have any desire to speak? 
Okay. The victims have spoke at the time that the 
pleas were entered, therefore the State doesn't have much more 
to say other than the fact that the State would definitely 
recommend, due to the nature of these crimes, that the two 
second degree felonies that the defendant is to be sentenced on 
today are to run consecutive to each other. 
THE COURT: I also have received and reviewed 15 
letters, as well as numerous documents concerning mental health 
issues with regard to the defendant. 
The February 18 report from the Utah State 
Hospital concludes that Mr. Gall has not retained any sort of 
stability and is still mentally ill and request continued 
treatment of him under the first degree felony. By way of 
sentencing then, Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, prior to sentencing, it 
was - - a letter I received from Mr. -- from the defendant, 
Leonard Gall, which I am convinced was probably written by his 
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father, he did indicate that there had been no motion for a 402 
reduction filed in this case. And that was a conscious 
decision on my part because I donTt — in my judgement of the 
case, I believe filing such a motion would really be frivolous 
in light of the circumstances of this case. But in deference 
to my client and his father, I would orally make that motion at 
this time that had the Court -- pursuant to 76-3-402, that the 
Court reduce each one of those second degree felonies to third 
degree felonies and at the same time sentence Mr. Gall to a 
concurrent sentence of zero to five on — with any weapon 
enhancement on those particular charges. 
And I think with that, the argument can be made that 
the circumstances of this case, being guilty but mentally ill, 
that Mr. Gall deserves the benefit of that statute. Other than 
that, I would submit it. 
THE COURT: Ms. Cameron, do you want to respond to 
Mr. McCaugheyr s motion? 
MS. CAMERON: Your Honor, the State would object to 
any 402 motion given the circumstances of this case. And there 
seems to be no mitigating circumstances at all involved with 
this. The defendant is mentally ill, that does not, however, 
lessen his culpability for his behavior, therefore the State 
vehemently objects to any 402 reduction and encourages the 
Court to sentence him consecutively on the sentences, one of 
which does carry a weapons enhancement. 
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THE COURT: All right. I am denying the motion for a 
402 reduction. This was a crime of extreme violence and a 402 
reduction is simply out of the question in this case. 
Mr. Gall, do you want to say anything to me before I 
sentence you on these two charges? 
THE DEFENDANT: I just want to say to the Court 
that -- and everyone — that I recognize my responsibility for 
my mother's death and I'm sorry to everyone for everything 
that's happened, especially to the Jenkins. I feel terrible 
about what's happened. I love my mom very much and I miss her. 
And also I have some concerns about the letters I 
wrote on the date of the incident, in it I wrote I killed my 
family for the same reason. My family may think I have some 
plans, intents, or desires to kill or harm them. I do not have 
any plans or intents or desires to kill any of them or harm any 
of them or anyone else. And that's all. 
THE COURT: All right. All right, Mr. Gall, thank 
you for those statements. 
A few words before sentencing. This case has been a 
tragedy, Mr. Gall, to you, to your family, and you recognize 
that, and your mother. It's also been, in a real sense, a 
tragedy for this entire community because of the inability to 
keep you safe and to keep your mother safe. If there's 
anything positive, I'm reluctant to even use that word with 
regard to this, is that perhaps legislation that was passed 
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subsequent to your mother's death may help in preventing this 
happening to somebody else. 
Your mother spent a great deal of time working with 
you and working with the community to help people suffering 
from mental illnesses such as yours. I hope in the future we, 
as a community, are able to be of greater assistance. 
All right, I make the following findings: I find 
first that by clear and convincing evidence that you, Mr. Gall, 
are currently mentally ill, continue to be mentally ill. Ifm 
also finding that because of your mental illness you pose an 
immediate physical danger to yourself and to others. 
Further, that the Department of Human Services is 
able to provide treatment, care, custody, and security that is 
adequate to meet your conditions and needs, therefore my 
sentence is as follows: I am committing — ITm ordering that 
you serve as indeterminate term, on Count I, of 1 to 15 years; 
Count II, 1 to 15 years; in addition, an enhancement of 1 year 
to 5 years concerning the firearm. They are to run 
consecutively with each other. 
I am committing you to the Department of Human 
Services. You will remain at the Utah State Hospital. And I'm 
committing you under the code section 77-16a-202 (1), 
subsection (a). And that leaves that the decision with regard 
to your transfer ultimately to the Department of Corrections 
and prison, as well as your decision -- any future decision of 
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readmission to the Utah State Hospital to the Department of 
Human Services and to the Department of Corrections. 
My order further is that these commitments commence 
forthwith. 
Mr. Gall, you will be at the Utah State Hospital 
where you will get treatment and be safe for a long period of 
time. And that's frankly my goal I think for almost everybody 
in this case from the very beginning. You -- today you look 
better than If ve ever seen you, much clearer thinking. And I 
hope that the time at the Utah State Hospital has helped you 
and that you will be able to be safe and get treatment at the 
hospital. Okay. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey, thank you. Ms. Cameron, 
thank you. 
MS. CAMERON: Thank you. 
(Proceedings concluded at 2:24 p.m.) 
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SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of MANSLAUGHTER a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
DEFENDANT TO BE IN CUSTODY OF DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES TO 
PROVIDE SERVICES. DEFENDANT TO REMAIN AT THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL. 
SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT NOTE 
COURT ORDER 1-6 YEARS FOR WEAPONS ENHANCEMENT. 
Dated this 3 day of 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Connie Sue LEBOW, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20050611-CA. 
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051700037; The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson. 
William L. Schultz, Moab, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, MCHUGH, and 
ORME. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Connie Sue Lebow appeals her conviction on a 
drug charge after pleading guilty. This is before the 
court on Lebow's motion for a remand pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B and on the 
State's motion for summary disposition based on lack 
ofjurisdiction. 
Although Lebow pleaded guilty and seeks to attack 
that plea on appeal, albeit on a theory of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, she did not file a motion to 
withdraw her plea in the district court. Her failure to 
timely file a motion to withdraw her plea bars this 
court from considering her challenge to the validity 
of her plea on appeal. 
Pursuant to Utah Code section 77-13-6, a request to 
withdraw a guilty plea must be made by a motion 
filed prior to sentencing. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
13-6(2)(b) (2003). The failure to timely file a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea "extinguishes a defendant's 
right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea on 
appeal." State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,f 3, 40 P.3d 
630; see also, State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 
585 (holding the time limit in section 77-13-6 is 
jurisdictional). Absent a timely motion to withdraw a 
plea, appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider any 
issue attacking the guilty plea itself, including 
whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in the plea agreement. See Merrill, 2005 UT 
34 at f f 17-19; State v.. Melo, 2001 UT App 392,1f 
If 6-8, 40 P.3d 646. Because Lebow failed to timely 
move to withdraw her guilty plea, this court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider her claim that she received 
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with 
her plea. Lebow has not raised any other issue that 
this court may review. 
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, based on the dismissal, 
Lebow's motion for remand is denied as moot. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 246562 (Utah 
App.), 2006 UT App 27 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
*1 Defendant Richard F. Norris appeals his 
conviction of attempted communications fraud. See 
Utah Code Ann. § § 76-4-101 to 76-10-1801 (1997). 
We affirm. 
In December 1994, West Valley City (West Valley) 
charged Defendant with four misdemeanor counts of 
communications fraud in the Third Circuit Court, 
West Valley Department. [FN1] See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1801(1) (1994). In February 1996, the 
circuit court dismissed the misdemeanor charges, 
ruling that the aggregate of the four misdemeanor 
counts exceeded the circuit court's jurisdictional limit 
of $1000.00. West Valley appealed the circuit court's 
decision. 
FN1. Circuit courts merged into district 
courts on July 1, 1996. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-1-2(1997). 
On December 10, 1996, because the State was 
prepared to file felony counts of communications 
fraud against Defendant in district court, West Valley 
moved this court to dismiss its appeal. On March 26, 
1997, this court dismissed the appeal, and on May 13, 
1997, this court issued a remittitur. Two days later, 
the State filed twenty felony charges of 
communications fraud against Defendant in district 
court. 
Defendant moved to recall the remittitur on the 
ground that it had been issued prematurely because 
Defendant's time to file a petition for certiorari had 
not expired. On June 26, 1997, the Utah Supreme 
Court ordered this court to recall the remittitur, which 
this court did on June 30, 1997. On September 26, 
1997, Defendant moved the district court to dismiss 
the felony charges because the West Valley case was 
still active. The district court did not dismiss the 
charges, but rather stayed its proceedings until all 
activity in the West Valley appeal had ceased. 
After Defendant's petitions for certiorari had been 
denied in both the Utah Supreme Court and the 
United States Supreme Court, this court reissued the 
remittitur on October 30, 1998. Defendant then 
moved the district court to dismiss the felony 
charges, claiming that (i) the communications fraud 
statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, 
and (ii) the district court lacked jurisdiction over the 
May 1997 felony charges because the May 1997 
remittitur was subsequently recalled. The district 
court denied the motions. 
Defendant then entered a conditional plea in which 
Defendant preserved his right to challenge the 
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute 
and the jurisdiction of the district court to hear the 
felony charges filed in May 1997. Defendant appeals 
these two issues. [FN2] 
FN2. Defendant attempts to raise numerous 
other issues in his briefs. We do not address 
these issues because they exceed the scope 
of what was preserved in the conditional 
plea. Defendant mentions plain error in a 
single paragraph, but fails to apply plain 
error doctrine to any of the specific issues 
raised. Thus, we do not address Defendant's 
plain error argument because it is 
inadequately briefed. See Utah RApp. P. 
24(a)(5)(B) ("The brief of the appellant shall 
contain ... a statement of grounds for seeking 
review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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court.")-
Defendant argues that the statute under which he was 
charged is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 
However, after this appeal was filed, this court 
addressed these specific challenges. See State v. 
Norris, 2004 UT App 267,1 f 8-16, 97 P.3d 732 
(holding that the communications fraud statute is 
neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor 
unconstitutionally vague). Thus, Defendant's 
constitutional challenges to the communications 
fraud statute fail. [FN3] 
FN3. Defendant claims that our prior 
decision did not directly deal with the phrase 
"anything of value," and thus we are free to 
hold that the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague on that basis. However, our prior 
decision did hold that "because Defendant 
was charged with devising a scheme to 
defraud others of money, his actions do not 
fall within the anything of value realm, and 
thus, he may not challenge this phrase as 
unconstitutionally vague." State v. Norris, 
2004 UT App 267,1f 15, 97 P.3d 732 
(quotations and citations omitted). In this 
case, Defendant also was charged with 
devising a scheme to defraud others of 
money, and thus under the rule articulated in 
Norris, Defendant also may not challenge 
this phrase as unconstitutionally vague in 
this case. See id. 
In addition, Defendant's challenge to the 
State charging multiple counts when one 
communication reaches numerous victims 
already has been decided by this court. See 
State v. Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, 99 
P.3d359. 
Defendant also challenges the jurisdiction of the trial 
court to hear the felony charges filed in May 1997. 
Specifically, Defendant argues that even though this 
court had issued a remittitur in the West Valley 
appeal before the felony charges were filed, the 
remittitur had no effect because it was subsequently 
recalled. We disagree. 
*2 "The determination of whether a court has subject 
matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we 
review for correctness, according no deference to the 
district court's determination." Beaver County v. 
Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,1 8, 31 P.3d 1147. The 
issue in this case is whether a valid order dismissing 
the misdemeanor charges in the West Valley case 
existed at the time felony charges were filed. The 
Page 2 
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parties focus their arguments on Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Ass'n. v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 
305 (Utah 1996), which held that actions taken by a 
trial court after a remittitur issues are void if the 
remittitur is subsequently recalled. See id. at 307. Hi-
Country, however, does not control the outcome of 
this case. 
The controlling case is Chase Manhattan Bank v. 
Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109. 
[FN4] In Chase Manhattan, the court outlined the 
situations in which judgments by appellate courts are 
self-executing. See id. at \ 11. The court concluded 
that, under the 1997 version of rule 36 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, where "the trial court 
need not act for a valid order to be found in the 
record," the judgment is self-executing unless a party 
specifically requests and is granted a stay of the 
remittitur before it issues. [FN5] Id. at f 12. 
Specifically, the court held that if a judgment by this 
court is self-executing, then a valid order exists on 
the record from the moment the remittitur is issued 
until it is subsequently recalled. See id. at Tf 7. 
FN4. The State cites Nielson v. Schiller, 92 
Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937), a civil case, 
for the proposition that a second-filed action 
should be stayed until the first-filed action 
has been resolved. See id. at 368. Because 
that case did not involve a remittitur, or even 
an appeal, it does not speak directly to the 
jurisdictional issue in this case. Rather, it 
merely indicates that in this case it was 
proper for the district court to issue a stay 
once it was aware that the appeal had been 
resuscitated. 
FN5. The current rule avoids the odd 
situation in this case by providing that a 
remittitur issues immediately after the time 
for filing a petition for certiorari has expired, 
unless such a petition is filed, in which case 
the remittitur is automatically stayed. See 
Utah R.App. P. 36(a)(2). 
In the West Valley appeal, acting on a motion by the 
appellant, this court dismissed the appeal. Dismissal 
of the West Valley appeal required no further action 
by the circuit court, but rather left in place the circuit 
court's ruling that dismissed the misdemeanor 
charges without prejudice. Thus, when the State filed 
felony charges in district court two days after this 
court issued a remittitur, no further action was 
required in the West Valley case. Therefore, a valid 
judgment existed on the record when felony charges 
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were filed. The subsequent recall of the remittitur on 
Defendant's motion did not change this fact. See id. at 
1f 1f 12-13. For this reason, the district court did not 
lack jurisdiction when charges were filed in this case. 
[FN6] Therefore, we affirm. 
FN6. Defendant claims that his due process 
rights were violated when the State 
vindictively prosecuted the felony case 
against him, and thus under Blackledge v. 
Perry, All U.S. 21 (1974), the due process 
violations strip the district court of 
jurisdiction. However, unlike in Blackledge, 
the record in this case does not indicate a 
"realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness,' " id. 
at 27, because (i) the original trial court 
dismissed the misdemeanor charges sua 
sponte, (ii) the appeal was taken by West 
Valley, not the Defendant, (iii) the State 
indicated its intention to file felony charges 
prior to Defendant asking the Utah Supreme 
Court to recall the appeal, and (iv) the State 
had a legitimate reason to file felony charges 
when it did, namely concern over the statute 
of limitations. While the State's actions in 
this case were less than ideal, the record 
does not come close to establishing 
prosecutorial vindictiveness in response to 
Defendant exercising his procedural rights 
on appeal. 
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate 
Presiding Judge and NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Judge. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 2749484 (Utah 
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